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THE FAULTY LAW AND ECONOMICS OF THE
“BASEBALL RULE”
NATHANIEL GROW* & ZACHARY FLAGEL**
ABSTRACT
This Article examines the so-called “Baseball Rule,” the legal doc-
trine generally immunizing professional baseball teams from li-
ability when spectators are hit by errant balls or bats leaving the
field of play. Following a recent series of high-profile fan injuries at
Major League Baseball (MLB) games, this century-old legal doctrine
has come under increased scrutiny, with both academic and media
commentators calling for its abolition. Nevertheless, despite these
criticisms, courts have almost uniformly continued to apply the
Baseball Rule to spectator-injury lawsuits.
This Article offers two contributions to the ongoing debate sur-
rounding the Baseball Rule. First, it provides new empirical evidence
establishing that the risk of being hit by an errant ball or bat at a
professional baseball game has increased considerably in recent
years. Specifically, fans attending MLB games today are sitting more
than 20 percent closer to the field than they were when the legal
doctrine was first established. This fact, along with other changes in
the way in which the game is played and presented to fans, have
converged to substantially reduce the reaction time that spectators
have to protect themselves from flying objects entering the stands,
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calling into question courts’ continued reliance on the century-old
rule.
Second, the Article makes the novel observation that courts and
academic commentators have, to date, largely failed to reconsider the
Baseball Rule in light of the emergence of the law-and-economics
movement, and in particular the contributions the movement has
offered regarding the optimal apportionment of tort liability. By
subjecting the doctrine to such an economic analysis, this Article
finds that the host team will usually constitute the lowest-cost or best
risk avoider, thus suggesting that the legal immunity currently pro-
vided to teams by the Baseball Rule inefficiently allocates tort lia-
bility in spectator-injury lawsuits.
As a result, the Article concludes by contending that future courts
(or legislatures) should reject the Baseball Rule and instead hold
professional baseball teams liable for spectator injuries. Specifical-
ly, it asserts that the Baseball Rule should be replaced by a strict-
liability regime, thereby better incentivizing teams to implement the
most economically efficient level of fan protection in their stadiums.
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INTRODUCTION
On September 20, 2017, a one-year-old girl was enjoying an af-
ternoon at the ballpark with her grandparents at Yankee Stadium
in New York City. Seated only five rows from the field, just past the
visitors’ dugout, the girl had a terrific view of that day’s game
between the Yankees and the Minnesota Twins.1 Unfortunately, the
young child’s proximity to the field also placed her at a heightened
risk of being hit by an errant ball or bat leaving the field of play.
In the bottom of the fifth inning, Yankees third baseman Todd
Frazier hit such a foul ball, a missile of a line drive that entered the
stands at a blistering 106 miles per hour.2 Before anyone could
react, the ball hit the girl squarely in the head, causing multiple
facial fractures—including to her orbital bone and nose—and
leaving a visible imprint of the ball’s seams on her forehead.3
While the young girl was fortunate to escape the incident without
being more seriously injured, the episode nevertheless quickly
sparked renewed concern over the issue of spectator safety at
professional baseball games.4 Although only a single fan to date has
lost his life after being hit by an errant ball or bat at a Major
1. See Andrew Marchand, Young Fan Taken from Yankees Game to Hospital After Being
Hit by Foul Ball, ESPN.COM (Sept. 21, 2017, 1:28 PM), http://www.espn.com/mlb/story/_/id/
20768433/young-fan-new-york-yankees-game-hit-face-foul-ball [https://perma.cc/N9RR-GKT3]
(reporting that the child was sitting “with her grandparents about five rows up on the third-
base side of Yankee Stadium”).
2. See Wallace Matthews, Line Drive Strikes Young Girl in the Face at Yankee Stadium,
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 20, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/20/sports/baseball/young-fan-is-
injured-by-line-drive-during-yankees-game.html [https://perma.cc/3QWS-6HXD] (reciting the
details of the incident).
3. See Billy Witz, Father of Girl Hit by Ball Recounts Ordeal, and the Yankees Promise
Fixes, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 1, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/01/sports/baseball/yankee-
stadium-netting-foul-ball.html [https://perma.cc/255Z-VCW6] (recounting the nature of the
girl’s injuries).
4. See, e.g., Michael McCann, Yankees Incident Revives an Old Question: How Respon-
sible are Teams for Foul Ball Injuries?, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Sept. 21, 2017), https://www.si.
com/mlb/2017/09/21/new-york-yankees-netting-ballpark-injury [https://perma.cc/FMW3-YZ9F]
(observing that the girl’s injuries have “sparked reconsideration of a longstanding legal
controversy: to what extent should teams be legally responsible for foul ball injuries?”); Larry
Neumeister, Girl Hit by Foul Ball at Yankees’ Game Gets Game’s Attention, SFGATE (Sept. 21,
2017, 7:50 PM), http://www.sfgate.com/sports/ article/Girl-hit-by-foul-ball-at-Yankees-game-
gets-12219276.php [https://perma.cc/2DAZ-JLB4] (characterizing the incident at Yankee
Stadium as a potential “game changer” for professional baseball).
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League Baseball (MLB) game,5 serious incidents like the one at
Yankee Stadium have become increasingly common in recent years,
occurring more frequently than many fans realize.6 Indeed, ac-
cording to a recent analysis by Bloomberg, approximately 1750 fans
are hurt each year by foul balls while attending MLB games.7 This
equates to a rate of roughly two injuries per every three games,
making a fan injury from a foul ball a more common occurrence
than a batter being hit by a pitch.8 Moreover, that estimate does not
include any injuries sustained by the more than forty million fans
who annually attend games hosted by one of the nearly 250 minor-
league teams competing at lower levels of professional baseball.9
Despite the frequency with which these incidents are increasingly
occurring, professional baseball teams have historically had little
motivation to take greater steps to protect their spectators from
injury.10 Under what has commonly become known as the “Baseball
5. See ROBERT M. GORMAN & DAVID WEEKS, DEATH AT THE BALLPARK: A COMPREHENSIVE
STUDY OF GAME-RELATED FATALITIES OF PLAYERS, OTHER PERSONNEL AND SPECTATORS IN
AMATEUR AND PROFESSIONAL BASEBALL, 1862-2007, 133 (2009) (reporting that 14-year-old
Alan Fish died in 1970 after being hit in the head by a line drive foul ball at a Los Angeles
Dodgers game). In addition, at least one fan has been killed by a foul ball while attending a
minor-league game. See id. at 134 (recounting that a 68-year-old fan at a then-minor-league
Miami Marlins game in 1960 was struck in the side of the head by a foul ball, and eventually
died two days later).
6. See id. at 131 (declaring that baseball “is among the most dangerous spectator
sports”).
7. Jennifer Beebe, Comment, Injuries from Foul Balls, Broken Bats, and Railing Fall-
Overs: Who is Liable?, 8 N. ILL. U. L. REV. ONLINE 65, 72-73 (2017) (citing David Glovin, Base-
ball Caught Looking as Fouls Injure 1,750 Fans a Year, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 9, 2014, 4:05 PM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-09-09/baseball-caught-looking-as-fouls-injure-
1-750-fans-a-year/ [https://perma.cc/DT2M-UHUH]).
8. Id.
9. See John Sickels, Minor League Baseball Attendance for 2016 Tops 41.3 Million,
MINORLEAGUEBALL.COM (Sept. 14, 2016, 12:32 PM), https://www.minorleagueball.com/2016/
9/14/12914896/minor-league-baseball-attendance-for-2016-tops-41-3-million [https://perma.cc/
5V55-EDGY] (reporting that “[a] total of 41,377,202 fans” attended minor-league games in
2016).
10. To its credit, in response to the aforementioned public scrutiny, MLB has recently
taken steps to incentivize its teams to adopt greater measures to protect their fans from
injury, primarily through the installation of additional protective netting. See infra note 309
and accompanying text (discussing efforts). While certainly laudable, as discussed infra, these
precautions do not obviate the need for a critical reassessment of the Baseball Rule, as there
is no guarantee that these teams’ voluntary measures are fully providing the most socially
desirable level of protection, see infra notes 303-05 and accompanying text, nor that they will
be adopted by the numerous teams competing at the minor-league level, see infra notes 311-14
64 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60:059
Rule,” courts for over a century have consistently held that profes-
sional baseball teams are not liable for injuries sustained by fans
hit by bats or balls leaving the field of play, so long as the teams
have taken minimal precautions to protect their spectators from
harm.11 Specifically, as traditionally applied, the Baseball Rule
imposes a legal duty upon professional teams to merely implement
two safety measures.12 First, teams are generally expected to install
protective netting to shield the “most dangerous area” of their sta-
diums from errant flying objects, a region rigidly interpreted by
courts to consist only of those sections of seats located immediately
behind home plate.13 Second, teams must also maintain a sufficient
number of screened seats to meet the anticipated consumer demand
for protected seating during an average game.14 Assuming a team
has satisfied these two requirements, then under the Baseball Rule
it is considered to have met the duty of care it owed to its patrons,
and therefore cannot be held legally liable for their injuries.15
and accompanying text (noting the potential shortcomings of MLB’s voluntary efforts).
11. See, e.g., Matthew J. Ludden, Take Me Out to the Ballgame ... but Bring a Helmet:
Reforming the “Baseball Rule” in Light of Recent Fan Injuries at Baseball Stadiums, 24 MARQ.
SPORTS L. REV. 123, 124 (2013) (stating that “the baseball rule holds stadium owners to a
lower duty of care for the safety of fans compared to the reasonable duty of care owed by most
property owners”); Aaron Wakamatsu, Note, Spectator Injuries: Examining Owner Negligence
and the Assumption of Risk Defense, 6 WILLAMETTE SPORTS L.J. 1, 1 (2009) (finding that
“[c]ourts have concluded that stadium owners and teams do not owe a duty to protect their
patrons from ‘common, frequent, and expected’ risks” such as those presented by foul balls
(quoting Jones v. Three Rivers Mgmt. Corp., 394 A.2d 546, 551 (Pa. 1978))).
12. Cases arising from foul-ball or errant-bat-related injuries are typically brought as
negligence actions, alleging that the team breached its duty of care by failing to take sufficient
precautions to protect fans from injuries. See Joshua D. Winneker et al., Who Let the Dogs
Out: Should a Stadium Owner Be Held Liable for Injuries Sustained From a Mascot’s Errant
Hot Dog Toss?, 21 JEFFREY S. MOORAD SPORTS L.J. 369, 370 (2014) (Lawsuits filed by “[f]ans
[who] have been hurt by foul balls or pieces of a bat ... have all been grounded in tort law
under a negligence theory.”).
13. See infra notes 90-92 and accompanying text (discussing the “most dangerous area”
requirement).
14. See infra notes 81-85 and accompanying text (discussing the sufficient number of seats
requirement).
15. See infra Part I.B (discussing the development of the Baseball Rule). The Baseball
Rule is thus a particularly narrow, sport-specific application of the general legal principle
holding that sports facilities are not liable for spectator injuries resulting from sporting
equipment leaving the playing field, so long as the facilities have taken reasonable measures
to protect their fans from injury. See Walter T. Champion, Jr., “At the Ol’ Ball Game” and
Beyond: Spectators and the Potential for Liability, 14 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 495, 504 (1991)
(noting that fans are owed a standard of ordinary or reasonable care by facilities hosting
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Although often erroneously attributed16 to the generally unen-
forceable liability waivers that teams routinely place on the back of
their tickets,17 courts have instead traditionally justified the Base-
ball Rule by observing that foul balls and flying bats are inherent
and unavoidable parts of the sport and thus present a risk that
anyone of ordinary intelligence attending a game should easily be
able to discern.18 Moreover, courts have noted that many spectators
actually prefer to watch the game from a seat unobstructed by
protective netting, to both enjoy a clearer view of the field and also
preserve the possibility of catching a foul ball, a cherished memento
for many fans.19 Thus, courts have crafted the Baseball Rule in
hopes of balancing the competing interests of enhancing fan safety
and spectator demand for unobstructed seating.20
Nevertheless, following a recent series of highly publicized ball-
park injuries like the one recently sustained by the young girl at
hockey games, professional wrestling matches, or automobile races).
16. See, e.g., Joe Nocera, The Score: No Lawyers, No Nets, Dozens of Injuries, BLOOMBERG
(May 11, 2017, 12:30 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2017-05-11/the-score-no-
lawyers-no-nets-dozens-of-injuries [https://perma.cc/LBS5-5NT6] (“However sympathetic they
might be, these injured fans have almost no ability to have their day in court. That’s because
every ticket to a baseball game comes with a disclaimer that reads something like this: ‘The
bearer of the ticket assumes all risk and danger incidental to the game of baseball.’”).
17. See, e.g., Yates v. Chi. Nat’l League Ball Club, Inc., 595 N.E.2d 570, 581 (Ill. App. Ct.
1992) (“[T]he disclaimer on the back of plaintiff ’s ticket could not form the basis of defense
because the print was so small that it was not legibly reproduced on the photocopy submitted
to the trial court. Plaintiff ’s acceptance of a ticket containing a disclaimer in fine print on the
back is not binding for the purposes of asserting express assumption of the risk.”).
18. See, e.g., Costa v. Bos. Red Sox Baseball Club, 809 N.E.2d 1090, 1093 (Mass. App. Ct.
2004) (“[W]e are persuaded that the potential for a foul ball to enter the stands and injure a
spectator who is seated in an unscreened area is, as matter of law, sufficiently obvious that
the defendant reasonably could conclude that a person of ordinary intelligence would perceive
the risk.”).
19. See Wells v. Minneapolis Baseball & Athletic Ass’n, 142 N.W. 706, 708 (Minn. 1913)
(“In fact, a large part of those who attend prefer to sit where no screen obscures the view. The
defendant has a right to cater to their desires.”); see also Brett Celedonia, Flying Objects:
Arena Liability for Fan Injuries in Hockey and Other Sports, 15 SPORTS LAW. J. 115, 130
(2008) (“[B]aseball has developed into a sport in which spectators not only hope, but expect
to come into contact with the ball.”). MLB teams have granted fans the right to keep foul balls
since 1921. See Glovin, supra note 7 (reporting that the custom of allowing fans to keep foul
balls dates back to May 16, 1921, when “a spectator at a New York Giants game ... refused
to surrender a ball knocked into Polo Grounds seating”).
20. See, e.g., Grimes v. Am. League Baseball Co., 78 S.W.2d 520, 523 (Mo. Ct. App. 1935)
(concluding that the Baseball Rule enables teams to balance fan demand for unscreened
seating with the need to protect the stadium’s most dangerous seating locations).
66 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60:059
Yankee Stadium,21 the continued justifiability of the Baseball Rule
has come under increased scrutiny, with both academic and media
commentators calling for the doctrine to be abolished.22 Indeed, des-
pite the slim chances of success in court, injured spectators rou-
tinely continue to file lawsuits against professional baseball teams
in hopes of persuading a judge to disavow the doctrine and impose
liability for the plaintiff ’s injuries.23 At the same time, however,
other fans have opposed the suggestion that teams should be legally
required to take greater precautions to protect spectators from in-
jury, fearing that any resulting efforts by teams to install additional
protective netting would deprive these individuals of their preferred
unobstructed views of the field.24
This Article seeks to offer two primary contributions to the re-
newed discussion surrounding, and heightened criticism of, the
Baseball Rule. First, the Article presents new empirical evidence
establishing the extent to which fans’ risk of being hit by a flying
object at a professional baseball game has increased in recent
years.25 Specifically, over the last quarter century, MLB teams have
built nearly two dozen new stadiums, almost all of which place
spectator seating significantly closer to the playing field than ever
before.26 As a result, fans today frequently sit more than 20 percent
21. In addition to the Yankee Stadium incident, for instance, on June 5, 2015, a fan
attending a game between the Oakland Athletics and Boston Red Sox at Fenway Park
suffered life-threatening injuries after being struck in the head by the shattered barrel of a
bat swung by Oakland second baseman, Brett Lawrie. See Vincent C. Lucchese, Fair or Foul:
The Baseball Rule’s Place in Modern Major League Baseball, 24 SPORTS L.J. 95, 99 (2017)
(discussing incident).
22. See, e.g., Bob Collins, After Fan is Hit by Bat, Calls to End ‘Baseball Rule’, MPR NEWS
(June 8, 2015, 8:15 AM), https://blogs.mprnews.org/newscut/2015/06/after-fan-is-hit-by-bat-a-
call-to-end-the-baseball-rule/ [https://perma.cc/377Z-DEPA] (summarizing criticisms of the
Baseball Rule); Nocera, supra note 16 (condemning the Baseball Rule); see also Mohit Khare,
Note, Foul Ball! The Need to Alter Current Liability Standards for Spectator Injuries at
Sporting Events, 12 TEX. REV. ENT. & SPORTS L. 91, 91 (2010) (contending that courts should
reject “limited duty” rules that protect sports teams from liability for fan injuries).
23. See J. Gordon Hylton, A Foul Ball in the Courtroom: The Baseball Spectator Injury as
a Case of First Impression, 38 TULSA L. REV. 485, 485 (2003) (“While the general legal rule
that spectators are considered to have assumed the risk of injury from foul balls has been
reiterated over and over, injured plaintiffs have continued to sue in hope of establishing
liability on the part of the park owner.”).
24. See Lucchese, supra note 21, at 96 (“[W]hen baseball fans first heard rumblings in the
media ... that netting should be extended, they vehemently denied the need for it.”).
25. See infra Part II.
26. See infra Part II.A.
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closer to home plate than was the case throughout most of the
twentieth century.27 This fact, along with a presumptive increase in
the speed with which baseballs are being hit into the stands, has
substantially reduced the reaction time that fans have to avoid
errant flying objects heading in their direction.28 Indeed, in some
cases it may now be virtually impossible for spectators to react in
time to protect themselves from a particularly hard-hit foul ball.29
Consequently, wayward balls and bats present a much greater risk
to fans today than at the time the Baseball Rule was first estab-
lished in 1913, undercutting the justifiability of courts’ continued
adherence to the century-old doctrine.30
Second, the Article makes the novel observation that courts have
uniformly failed to reconsider the Baseball Rule in light of the
lessons instilled by the law-and-economics revolution of the 1970s
and 1980s, and in particular the insights it provided regarding the
most efficient allocation of liability in torts cases.31 Indeed, no prior
court or academic commentator has subjected the Baseball Rule to
a full-blown economic analysis, a surprising omission given how
dramatically the law-and-economics movement has altered the
collective understanding of the ideal apportionment of negligence
liability.32 This Article attempts to correct this oversight by an-
alyzing the doctrine under economic principles of optimal risk al-
location, concluding that, because the host team itself will almost
always be the lowest cost or best risk avoider, the traditional Base-
ball Rule improperly shields teams from legal liability.33
Given these insights, the Article ultimately concludes that courts
should no longer adhere to the Baseball Rule and should instead
27. See infra text accompanying note 158.
28. See infra Part II.B.
29. See infra notes 177-81 and accompanying text.
30. Cf. Ludden, supra note 11, at 125 (contending that evidence of the increased risk of
injury was previously “too speculative” to increase teams’ liability under the Baseball Rule).
31. See infra Part III.A.
32. See infra Part III.A.
33. Along these same lines, although this Article predominately focuses on injuries
sustained by spectators at professional baseball games, this analysis likely applies with equal
force to other sports—such as professional hockey—where some courts have also imposed a
lesser standard of care on teams to protect their fans. Cf. Celedonia, supra note 19, at 122-26
(discussing cases in which courts have held that professional hockey teams are not liable for
injuries sustained by fans hit by errant pucks).
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expand the extent to which professional baseball teams may be held
legally responsible for injuries sustained by their spectators.34 The
Article proceeds in four parts. Part I begins by examining the his-
torical evolution of the Baseball Rule, surveying its origin in 1913
as well as its subsequent judicial development over the last century.
Part II then examines the extent to which the risk of being injured
by an errant ball or bat at a professional baseball game has in-
creased in recent years. In particular, Part II presents new empiri-
cal data establishing that fans’ ability to defend themselves from
flying projectiles has decreased considerably due to recent trends in
both stadium construction and the way in which baseball is played
and presented to fans. Next, Part III considers the failure of courts
to adapt their application of the Baseball Rule to two important
changes in the underlying law of torts, namely the rise of the law-
and-economics movement and the recent judicial repudiation of the
traditional tort defense of assumption of risk. Finally, Part IV offers
several suggestions for how courts should modify their Baseball
Rule jurisprudence to more equitably resolve lawsuits brought by
fans injured by errant balls or bats while attending professional
baseball games. Most notably, it asserts that courts (and legisla-
tures) should replace the Baseball Rule with a strict-liability re-
gime, forcing teams to internalize the cost of spectator injuries,
thereby best incentivizing them to implement the most economically
efficient level of fan protection in their stadiums.
I. THE HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF THE BASEBALL RULE
The typical spectator injury lawsuit presents an injured fan suing
the host team and/or stadium operator35 on a theory of negligence.36
34. This Article predominately focuses on the applicability of the Baseball Rule to cases
involving injuries sustained at professional, as opposed to amateur, baseball games. As noted
below, the application of the Baseball Rule to amateur facilities triggers different potential
policy considerations, arguably warranting a different allocation of legal liability. See infra
notes 295-98 and accompanying text.
35. In addition to the host team itself, legal liability for spectators’ injuries may also
potentially extend to other affiliated entities that own or manage the team’s stadium,
typically taking the form of some sort of governmental agency or authority. See A. David
Austill, When it Hits the Fan: Will There Be Liability for the Broken Bat?, 24 MARQ. SPORTS
L. REV. 83, 93 (2013) (observing that there may be an additional stadium-operator defendant
in foul-ball cases in addition to the team itself). For simplicity’s sake, this Article will refer
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Because spectators are considered to be invitees on the defendant’s
premises, teams would normally owe their fans a duty of care to
protect the patrons from reasonably foreseeable dangers.37 Plaintiffs
will thus contend that given the generally predictable nature of
errant balls or bats leaving the field of play, the defendant team
breached its duty of care by failing to implement more robust safety
precautions—such as a larger protective screen or net—to better
protect fans from the risk posed by these flying objects.38 Histori-
cally, courts have all but uniformly resolved these cases in the
team’s favor under the Baseball Rule.39
A. The Origins of the Baseball Rule
Considering that baseball has been played professionally for
nearly 150 years—dating back to the founding of the first all-pro-
fessional team, the Cincinnati Red Stockings, in 186940—it is
somewhat surprising that the first reported decision in a foul-ball
liability case was not issued by a court until 1913.41 Much of this
to these potential defendant entities collectively as the “team” itself.
36. See Winneker et al., supra note 12, at 370 (stating that lawsuits filed by “[f]ans [who]
have been hurt by foul balls or pieces of a bat ... have all been grounded in tort law under a
negligence theory”).
37. See C. Peter Goplerud III & Nicolas P. Terry, Allocation of Risk Between Hockey Fans
and Facilities: Tort Liability After the Puck Drops, 38 TULSA L. REV. 445, 448 (2003) (charac-
terizing spectators as invitees and noting that such categorization places a duty of reasonable
care upon the host team).
38. See id. at 449 (finding that in cases involving an injury from an errant flying object,
“the plaintiff will argue negligence in failing to provide sufficient ‘safe’ or protected areas, that
the barrier was inadequate in its dimensions or location, or that the barrier was improperly
constructed or maintained”). 
39. See infra Part I.A. It is worth noting that the Baseball Rule has traditionally applied
only to injuries arising from unintentional conduct occurring on the playing field; an injury
sustained by a spectator from an intentional tortious act by a player—such as a player
purposely throwing a bat into the stands in an attempt to injure a fan—would likely be
treated differently by the courts. See Champion, supra note 15, at 496 (stating that fans “do
not ... assume the risk of intentional harm” such as that arising from an “outfielder who
charges into the stands and assaults a heckler”). But see Loughran v. Phillies, 888 A.2d 872,
874, 876-77 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005) (applying the Baseball Rule in a case where a fan was
injured after Philadelphia Phillies outfielder, Marlon Byrd, intentionally tossed a baseball
into the stands at the end of an inning as a souvenir).
40. See, e.g., Lara Grow & Nathaniel Grow, Protecting Big Data in the Big Leagues: Trade
Secrets in Professional Sports, 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1567, 1571 (2017) (noting that the
Cincinnati Red Stockings of 1869 were the nation’s first professional sports team).
41. See Hylton, supra note 23, at 486 (observing that Crane v. Kan. City Baseball &
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delay is likely attributable to differences in the way baseball was
played in its early professional days.42 Quite unlike the game that
fans are accustomed to today, in its early form, professional baseball
featured pitchers throwing the ball in an underhanded fashion to
batters, who in turn instructed the hurler on where to locate the
pitch.43 These two factors significantly reduced the odds that a
batter would errantly strike a ball in such a manner that it would
enter the stands, thus decreasing the likelihood of spectator in-
juries.44
However, with the onset of overhand pitching in 1884, along with
rule changes that no longer allowed batters to call the location of
their pitches, the potential danger to fans increased.45 Indeed, the
threat of injury to spectators sitting immediately behind home plate
quickly grew to the point that this area colloquially became known
as the “slaughter pen.”46 Not surprisingly, as a result, most profes-
sional baseball teams quickly began to follow the lead of the
National League’s Providence Grays, which in 1879 became the first
team to erect a screen protecting a portion of its stadium seating
area from errantly tossed or hit baseballs.47 Despite initial fan
complaints about the obstruction these nets presented, by the late
1880s some form of protective screening had nevertheless become
commonplace throughout professional baseball.48
Exhibition Co. was the first reported decision in a foul-ball-related case). As Professor Hylton
notes, however, media reports suggest that fans may have filed earlier cases, although no
reported decision ultimately resulted from these disputes. See id. at 486 n.4.
42. See id. at 486-88.
43. See GORMAN & WEEKS, supra note 5, at 131 (arguing that “[i]n the formative years of
the game, there was not much reason to be concerned for fan safety” due to “the underhand
style of delivering the ball” along with the fact that “the batter called for the pitch”); Hylton,
supra note 23, at 486-87 (contending that underhanded pitching rules meant that “skilled
batters had little trouble hitting the ball squarely, and thus sharply hit foul balls infrequently
entered the areas in which spectators where [sic] likely to be situated”).
44. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
45. See GORMAN & WEEKS, supra note 5, at 131 (“[A] rule change in 1884 [allowing] for
overhand pitching ... result[ed] in more foul balls.”).
46. See Hylton, supra note 23, at 488 (observing that the “frequency of injuries suffered
by those” sitting behind home plate resulted in that area earning “the nickname the ‘slaughter
pen’”).
47. See id.
48. See id. (stating that “[i]n spite of the safety they provided, the new screens were not
always well received” by fans, but nevertheless were commonplace “by the late 1880s”).
2018] LAW AND ECONOMICS OF THE “BASEBALL RULE” 71
The existence of such protective netting would prove central to
the first reported judicial decision considering a baseball team’s
liability for a foul-ball-related fan injury. In the 1913 case of Crane
v. Kansas City Baseball & Exhibition Co., the Missouri Court of
Appeals considered whether to hold the Kansas City Blues of the
minor-league American Association liable for an injury sustained by
a fan hit by a foul ball while sitting in an unprotected seat down the
third-base line of the team’s stadium.49 Because the Blues did not
sell any reserved seats, all seating at the stadium was available on
a first-come, first-served general admission basis.50 On the day in
question, the plaintiff, S.J. Crane, had purchased a $0.50 grand-
stand ticket,51 providing him with several advantages over a cheap-
er, $0.25 bleacher ticket.52 Specifically, in addition to being seated
closer to the action in the stadium’s main seating area, fans with
grandstand tickets could also choose whether to sit in a seat behind
the protective screen—which extended from home plate down to
third base at the Blues’ stadium—or instead sit in an unprotected
seat providing an unobstructed view.53
Crane ultimately elected to sit in a seat not protected by netting54
and at some point during the game was hit by a foul ball.55 He then
sued the team for negligence, alleging that it should have taken
greater precautions to protect him from injury.56 In response, the
Blues pled two affirmative defenses, denying liability because Crane
had both (i) assumed the risk of injury and (ii) been contributorily
negligent by electing to sit in an unprotected seat.57
49. 153 S.W. 1076, 1077 (Mo. Ct. App. 1913); see also Hylton, supra note 23, at 493-94
(recounting the facts of the case).
50. Crane, 153 S.W. at 1077 (“Reserved seats are not sold.”).
51. Id. (“[T]he fee to the grand stand being 50 cents.... Plaintiff attended a game as a spec-
tator, and paid for admission to the grand stand.”).
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. (reporting that “during the progress of the game” Crane “was struck by a foul ball
and injured”).
56. See Hylton, supra note 23, at 494 (“In his complaint, Crane asserted that the ballpark
owner had been negligent in failing to screen in the entire grandstand and that this
negligence was the proximate cause of his injury.”).
57. Crane, 153 S.W. at 1076 (stating that the defendant’s “answer ... pleads contributory
negligence and assumed risk”).
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In deciding the case, the Missouri appellate court began by dis-
cussing the duty of care that the defendant team owed to spectators
like Crane.58 In particular, the court noted that as a business en-
gaged in “providing a public entertainment for profit,” the team was
not legally obligated to completely ensure the safety of its fans (such
as by installing netting to protect each and every seat in the
stadium from an errant ball or bat).59 Instead, the court held that
the defendants were simply expected to “exercise reasonable care,
i.e., care commensurate to the circumstances of the situation, to
protect their patrons against injury.”60
Applying this standard to the professional baseball industry, the
Crane court placed particular emphasis on an agreed upon state-
ment of facts the parties had jointly filed in the case.61 That state-
ment acknowledged that “[b]aseball is our national game, and ... the
risks and dangers incident thereto are matters of common knowl-
edge.”62 Along those lines, the court observed that the game of
baseball involved “hard balls ... thrown and batted with great force
and swiftness,” with the result that “such balls often go in the di-
rection of the spectators.”63 Given the nature of the dangers inherent
to the game, the court then stated that the “duty of defendants
towards their patrons included that of providing seats protected by
screening from wildly thrown or foul balls, for the use of patrons
who desired such protection.”64 Because the team had provided
Crane with the option of sitting in a grandstand seat protected by
a screen, the court thus determined that the defendant team had
fully met its legal duty.65 As a result, because the plaintiff “volun-
tarily chose [to sit in] an unprotected seat,” the court determined
that he “assumed the ordinary risks of such position,” and thus was
not entitled to any recovery for his resulting injuries.66
58. Id. at 1077.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 1076 (“The cause was submitted to the trial court on an agreed statement of
facts.”).
62. Id. at 1077.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 1078.
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Other early courts followed the lead of the Crane decision, hold-
ing that so long as teams provided a screened seating option for
their fans, a spectator choosing to sit in an unprotected seat as-
sumed the risk of his injury.67 A few months later in 1913, for in-
stance, the Supreme Court of Minnesota cited the Crane opinion
approvingly in Wells v. Minneapolis Baseball & Athletic Ass’n.68 As
in Crane, the plaintiff in Wells had been injured by a foul ball while
sitting in an unscreened section of the ballpark.69 And as in Crane,
the Wells court ultimately held that when a fan decides to attend a
baseball game “with full knowledge of the danger from thrown or
batted balls ... the management cannot be held negligent when it
provides a choice between a screened in and an open seat: the screen
being reasonably sufficient as to extent and substance.”70 Further-
more, the Wells court noted that while “[b]aseball is not free from
danger to those witnessing the game,” its “perils are not so immi-
nent that due care on the part of the management requires all the
spectators to be screened in.”71 To the contrary, the court observed
that “[i]n fact, a large part of those who attend prefer to sit where
no screen obscures the view. The defendant has a right to cater to
their desires.”72 Likewise, the Supreme Court of Washington cited
both Crane and Wells when ruling against an injured fan in 1919 in
Kavafian v. Seattle Baseball Club Ass’n.73
Indeed, subsequent courts adopted the same rationale even in
cases where the injured fan had erroneously been sold a ticket to an
unscreened seat after requesting one in a protected seating area.74
Moreover, courts also refused to impose liability on teams when an
injured fan alleged that she was unaware of the risks posed by the
67. See Gil Fried & Robin Ammon Jr., Baseball Spectators’ Assumption of Risk: Is it “Fair”
or “Foul”?, 13 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 39, 41-43 (2002) (noting subsequent courts’ reliance on
Crane).
68. 142 N.W. 706, 708 (Minn. 1913).
69. Id. at 707 (“Plaintiff testified that she took a seat ... about 10 feet west of the easterly
end of the screen.”).
70. Id. at 708. The Wells court went on to note that “[t]his is virtually the rule applied in
Crane [sic].” Id. 
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. 181 P. 679, 679 (Wash. 1919); see also Quinn v. Recreation Park Ass’n, 46 P.2d 144,
146 (Cal. 1935) (per curiam); Curtis v. Portland Baseball Club, 279 P. 277, 278 (Or. 1929).
74. See, e.g., Hudson v. Kan. City Baseball Club, 164 S.W.2d 318, 319, 323-25 (Mo. 1942);
Schentzel v. Phila. Nat’l League Club, 96 A.2d 181, 183, 185-87 (Pa. 1953). 
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sport, with the courts concluding that the danger of foul balls was
sufficiently obvious that even those unfamiliar with the game
should have been able to discern it.75 This marked an extension of
the original logic in Crane, where the court had only assumed the
plaintiff understood the risk of injury because he had admitted as
much in an agreed upon statement of facts.76
That having been said, courts did not always rule in the team’s
favor as a historical matter. Courts did, for instance, require teams
to provide satisfactory netting for fans, such as in the case of Edling
v. Kansas City Baseball & Exhibition Co.—decided by the same
Missouri appellate court a year following Crane—in which the de-
fendant team was held liable for an injury caused by a foul ball that
struck a fan after flying through a square-foot-sized hole in the
stadium’s protective netting.77 However, in cases where a fan was
struck by a ball that merely curved around otherwise sufficient net-
ting, courts refused to impose liability on the team.78
B. The Continued Development of the Baseball Rule
While in its initial form the Baseball Rule simply obligated teams
to offer their spectators a choice between protected and unprotected
seating,79 by the 1930s courts applying this principle began to add
several additional, seemingly modest, requirements. In Brisson v.
Minneapolis Baseball & Athletic Ass’n, for instance, the Supreme
75. See, e.g., Brown v. S.F. Ball Club, Inc., 222 P.2d 19, 21 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1950) (“We
find nothing here to take appellant outside the usual rule, whether it be said that this ‘com-
mon knowledge’ of these obvious and inherent risks are imputed to her or that they are
obvious risks which should have been observed by her in the exercise of ordinary care.”);
Schentzel, 96 A.2d at 186 (“It strains our collective imagination to visualize the situation of
the wife of a man obviously interested in the game, whose children view the games on the
home television set, and who lives in a metropolitan community, so far removed from that
knowledge as not to be chargeable with it.”).
76. See supra notes 60-62 and accompanying text (discussing same).
77. 168 S.W. 908, 909 (Mo. Ct. App. 1914) (“[T]he evidence of plaintiff tends to show that
the ball which struck him passed through a hole almost a square foot in area, that there were
many holes of various sizes, and through which a ball could pass, scattered over the screening,
and the inference from all of the evidence of plaintiff is very strong that the screening was old,
worn, and rotten, and had not been repaired in either that or the preceding season.”).
78. See, e.g., Curtis v. Portland Baseball Club, 279 P. 277, 277-78 (Or. 1929); see also
Benejam v. Detroit Tigers, Inc., 635 N.W.2d 219, 220, 227 (Mich. Ct. App. 2001).
79. See supra notes 61-67 and accompanying text.
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Court of Minnesota was presented with a case in which the plaintiff
was forced to sit in an unscreened location after all of the protected
seats had been taken by other fans.80 Thus, in the words of the
Brisson court, the case raised the novel question of whether a team
“must provide screened seats for all those who desire them, regard-
less of the number of spectators who come to see the game.”81 The
court ultimately answered this question in the negative, holding
that a team satisfied its duty of care when it “provide[d] screen[ing]
for the most dangerous part of the grandstand and for those who
may be reasonably anticipated to desire protected seats.”82 Thus, in
cases where demand for screened seating was unusually high, there
was no legal obligation for the team to provide a protected seat for
every fan who desired one.83
The Brisson decision modified the Baseball Rule—as originally
formulated in Crane and Wells—in two important ways. First,
Brisson clarified that rather than providing a de minimis amount
of screened seating, to avoid liability teams must instead protect a
sufficient number of seats to satisfy the typical demand for pro-
tected seating.84 Subsequent courts have continued to adopt this
formulation of a team’s duty of care.85 
Second, and perhaps more significantly, the Brisson court added
an additional new requirement to the Baseball Rule: affirmatively
obligating teams to screen “the most dangerous part of the grand
stand.”86 Although at first glance this addition would appear to
80. 240 N.W. 903, 903 (Minn. 1932) (“For the game at which he was hurt plaintiff bought
a ticket for a grand-stand seat, but asserts that such seats were all filled when he arrived.”).
81. Id. at 904.
82. Id.
83. See id.
84. See id.
85. See, e.g., Quinn v. Recreation Park Ass’n, 46 P.2d 144, 146 (Cal. 1935) (per curiam)
(“The duty imposed by law is performed when screened seats are provided for as many as may
be reasonably expected to call for them on any ordinary occasion.”); Cates v. Cincinnati Ex-
hibition Co., 1 S.E.2d 131, 133 (N.C. 1939) (“Those operating baseball parks or grounds are
held to have discharged their full duty to spectators in safeguarding them from the danger of
being struck by thrown or batted balls by providing adequately screened seats for patrons who
desire them, and leaving the patrons to their choice between such screened seats and those
unscreened.”); Leek v. Tacoma Baseball Club, Inc., 229 P.2d 329, 330 (Wash. 1951) (“There
is no obligation to screen all such seats, however, and the proprietor’s duty is fulfilled when
screened seats are provided for as many as may reasonably be expected to call for them on any
ordinary occasion.”).
86. Brisson, 240 N.W. at 904.
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represent only a minimal expansion of the traditional doctrine, in
reality this new obligation changed the rule in important, but here-
tofore unrecognized, ways. Indeed, as originally formulated, the
Baseball Rule simply required that teams give spectators a choice
between screened and unscreened seating, thus generally ensuring
that fans could exercise their own free will by selecting a protected
seat or else assume the risk of sitting in an unprotected location.87
Following Brisson, however, teams now had an obligation to take
steps to protect spectators seated in locations subject to the high-
est risk of injury.88 Thus, Brisson imposed an affirmative duty on
teams to safeguard at least a portion of their fans, whether these
spectators desired such protection or not.89
As with the requirement that teams provide sufficient screened
seating to meet normal anticipated demand, subsequent courts
have also generally adhered to the Brisson requirement that teams
must protect the “most dangerous area” of their stadiums.90
However, rather than interpreting this requirement flexibly—
relying on a case-by-case determination of risk levels present in var-
ious seating sections of a particular stadium—subsequent courts
have instead almost uniformly held that this standard only requires
teams to screen the area immediately behind home plate,91 some-
thing virtually every professional team has done since the 1880s.92
Meanwhile, in addition to modestly expanding the scope of teams’
duty of care under the Baseball Rule, over time courts have also
carved out a few limited exceptions to the doctrine. The first of these
87. See Crane v. Kan. City Baseball & Exhibition Co., 153 S.W. 1076, 1077-78 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1913).
88. See Brisson, 240 N.W. at 904.
89. See id.
90. See Fried & Ammon Jr., supra note 67, at 44 (noting that “most courts [have] adopted
a ‘two-prong’ test” with the first stating “that the facility owner must protect the most dan-
gerous section of the ballpark”).
91. See, e.g., Yates v. Chi. Nat’l League Ball Club, Inc., 595 N.E.2d 570, 580 (Ill. App. Ct.
1992) (“[W]e note that numerous courts have recognized the area behind home plate as the
most dangerous area of the ballpark.”); Coronel v. Chi. White Sox, Ltd., 595 N.E.2d 45, 47 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1992) (“The most dangerous part of a ball park is universally recognized as the area
behind home plate.”); cf. Lawson ex rel. Lawson v. Salt Lake Trappers, Inc., 901 P.2d 1013,
1015 (Utah 1995) (“[W]e hold that the Trappers had a duty to screen the area behind home
plate.”).
92. See supra notes 45-48 and accompanying text (discussing the history of the use of
protective netting at professional baseball games).
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exceptions dates back to 1925, imposing liability on a team when a
fan is injured when multiple balls are simultaneously in use on the
field.93 In Cincinnati Baseball Club Co. v. Eno, a fan sitting in an
unscreened section of the stadium was struck in the jaw by one of
several balls in use during a session of batting practice held during
the intermission between two games of a double-header.94 Although
the Supreme Court of Ohio concurred with the general doctrine
originally set forth in Crane and Wells limiting a team’s liability
once it offered its fans a choice of protected or unprotected seats,95
the court nevertheless determined that that rule did not govern the
case before it.96 Instead, emphasizing the fact that the ball that
struck the plaintiff was hit just fifteen to twenty-five feet from
where she sat,97 the Eno court held that “it is impossible for the
spectator to protect [her]self by watching the ball” in situations
where there are “several balls ... simultaneously in play upon the
field.”98 As a result, the court allowed the plaintiff to proceed to trial
against the team.99 Another court reached a similar outcome in
Maytnier v. Rush, when a fan was injured by an errantly tossed ball
thrown by a pitcher warming up in the bullpen while the game was
in progress on the playing field.100
93. See Cincinnati Baseball Club Co. v. Eno, 147 N.E. 86, 87, 89 (Ohio 1925).
94. Id. at 87 (noting that the fan alleges she was hit by a “batted ball[ ] inflicted in the
intermission between two set games, commonly called a ‘double header’”).
95. Id. at 87 (summarizing Crane, Wells, and Kavafian, before stating, “[w]e concur in the
soundness of the views expressed in the above cases with regard to injuries incurred by balls
thrown or batted during the course of a baseball game”). 
96. Id. at 88 (“This case, however, presents a situation materially different from those
above cited both as to the liability of the defendants and as to the contributory negligence of
the plaintiff.”). 
97. Id. (“Evidence was given tending to show that the players while batting the ball were
from 15 to 25 feet from the grand stand.”).
98. Id.
99. Id. at 89 (“Hence the Court of Appeals did not err in reversing the judgment of the
court of common pleas.”).
100. See 225 N.E.2d 83, 89 (Ill. App. Ct. 1967) (“The facts here in issue evidence an entirely
different situation in which the plaintiff was struck by a ball, not in play in the game, coming
from his left at a time when the spectators’ attentions were focused on the ball actually in
play in the game, to plaintiff ’s right.”). But see Brummerhoff v. St. Louis Nat’l Baseball Club,
149 S.W.2d 382, 383-84 (Mo. Ct. App. 1941) (holding that a team is not liable for an injury
sustained by a fan after being hit by a ball during batting practice); McNiel v. Fort Worth
Baseball Club, 268 S.W.2d 244, 245, 247 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954) (same). See generally Scott B.
Kitei, Note, Is the T-Shirt Cannon “Incidental to the Game” in Professional Athletics?, 11
SPORTS LAW. J. 37, 45-47 (2004) (discussing cases).
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Second, some courts have held that teams may be liable for in-
juries sustained by fans while stationed in a non-seating area of the
stadium. In Jones v. Three Rivers Management Corp., for instance,
a fan was hit by a ball while standing in an interior walkway within
the ballpark.101 Finding that the danger of being hit by a foul ball
while standing in such an area of the stadium was not one that most
fans would find to be “common, frequent [or] expected,”102 the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that the Baseball Rule did not
foreclose the plaintiff ’s lawsuit against the team.103 Similarly, in
Maisonave v. Newark Bears Professional Baseball Club, Inc., the
Supreme Court of New Jersey ruled that a fan could proceed with
his case after being struck by a ball while purchasing a beverage in
the stadium concourse.104
Finally, two courts have allowed cases to proceed when a fan was
injured as the result of a distraction created by the defendant team’s
mascot. In Lowe v. California League of Professional Baseball, a
spectator was hit in the eye by a foul ball after having his attention
diverted by the Rancho Cucamonga Quakes’s dinosaur mascot, Tre-
mor, who repeatedly bumped the plaintiff ’s shoulder with his tail.105
Although the court agreed that fans sitting in unprotected seating
areas normally cannot recover for their injuries, it found that the
team nevertheless “had a duty not to increase the inherent risks to
which spectators at professional baseball games are regularly ex-
posed.”106 Because mascots are “not integral to the sport of base-
ball,”107 the court concluded that the plaintiff should be allowed to
101. 394 A.2d 546, 547-48 (Pa. 1978) (noting that the plaintiff was hit while standing in an
interior walkway on the second level of the stadium).
102. Id. at 551.
103. Id. at 552 (“The Superior Court was in error when it extended to appellant, standing
in this walkway, the no-duty rule applicable to patrons in the stands.”).
104. See 881 A.2d 700, 702 (N.J. 2005) (“[A] foul ball struck plaintiff in the face as he
purchased a beverage from a mobile vending cart on the concourse of a minor league sta-
dium.”); see also Rountree v. Boise Baseball, LLC, 296 P.3d 373, 375 (Idaho 2013) (allowing
a fan to proceed with a case after being hit in the stadium’s Executive Club restaurant, one
of the only areas of the stadium not protected by netting). Maisonave was eventually
superseded by statute, as discussed below. See New Jersey Baseball Spectator Safety Act of
2006, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:53A-43-48 (West 2006); see also infra Part I.D.
105. 65 Cal. Rptr. 2d 105, 105-06 (Ct. App. 1997).
106. Id. at 106.
107. Id. at 109 (emphasis omitted).
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proceed to trial against the team.108 Likewise, in Coomer v. Kansas
City Royals Baseball Corp., the Missouri Supreme Court allowed a
spectator to proceed with his lawsuit after he was hit in the eye by
a hot dog thrown between innings by the Kansas City Royals’s
mascot, Sluggerrr.109 Aside from these limited exceptions, however,
the vast majority of jurisdictions today continue to adhere to the
Baseball Rule in cases where a fan is injured while sitting in an
unprotected area of the stadium.110
Recognizing that they faced slim odds of success by pursuing neg-
ligence claims against teams on the basis of insufficient screening,
beginning in the late 1970s plaintiffs often began to pursue parallel
claims alleging that the defendant team was negligent due to its
failure to warn spectators of the potential danger presented by foul
balls.111 As with claims based on a failure to provide sufficient
screening, courts generally have also been unsympathetic to these
failure-to-warn claims.112 In particular, courts have held that be-
cause the dangers posed by foul balls are “open and obvious,” teams
did not have a duty to provide warnings to spectators.113 As a result,
fans have generally fared no better on this theory than they did in
the more traditional cases discussed above.114
108. Id. at 112.
109. See 437 S.W.3d 184, 188 (Mo. 2014) (“In the past, this Court has held that spectators
cannot sue a baseball team for injuries caused when a ball or bat enters the stands.... The risk
of being injured by Sluggerrr's hotdog toss, on the other hand, is not an unavoidable part of
watching the Royals play baseball.”).
110. See, e.g., Payne v. Office of the Comm'r of Baseball, No. 15-cv-03229-YGR, 2016 WL
6778673, at *7 n.6 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 16, 2016) (“[A] majority of states follow the ‘Baseball Rule,’
which limits the duty of care that stadium owners and operators owe to spectators.”), aff ’d,
705 F. App’x 654 (9th Cir. 2017). But see S. Shore Baseball, LLC v. DeJesus, 11 N.E.3d 903,
909 (Ind. 2014) (declining to adopt the Baseball Rule, and instead concluding that such a
decision should be made legislatively, rather than judicially).
111. See, e.g., Jones v. Three Rivers Mgmt. Corp., 394 A.2d 546, 548 (Pa. 1978); Friedman
v. Hous. Sports Ass’n, 731 S.W.2d 572, 573 (Tex. App. 1987). Although plaintiffs primarily
began to pursue parallel claims beginning in the late 1970s, a case did arise in 1950 that also
brought such a claim. See Anderson v. Kan. City Baseball Club, 231 S.W.2d 170, 173 (Mo.
1950).
112. See, e.g., Costa v. Bos. Red Sox Baseball Club, 809 N.E. 2d 1090, 1092 (Mass. App. Ct.
2004); Benejam v. Detroit Tigers, Inc., 635 N.W.2d 219, 220 (Mich. Ct. App. 2001).
113. See Friedman, 731 S.W.2d at 573, 575 (“[T]here is no duty to warn of the risk of being
hit by batted balls when attending a baseball game, because the risk is obvious.”) (quoting
Falkner v. John E. Fetzer, Inc., 317 N.W.2d 337, 339 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982)).
114. But see Coronel v. Chi. White Sox, Ltd., 595 N.E.2d 45, 50 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992) (“[T]he
Sox were under a duty to warn plaintiff of the possible dangers of being struck by a foul-tipped
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C. The Subsequent Mischaracterization of the Baseball Rule
While most courts have thus continued to adhere to the Baseball
Rule first established in Crane and Wells—and as enlarged by Bris-
son—their characterization of the underlying legal basis for the
rule has changed in important, but largely unrecognized, ways.
Traditionally, courts applying the doctrine had held that teams
owed their fans a standard duty of reasonable care.115 As the logic
went, so long as teams installed protective screening in front of the
most dangerous area of the stadium, and provided a sufficient
number of protected seats to meet ordinary demand, then the team
had satisfied its duty of care by providing protection appropriate to
the degree of risk entailed in watching a professional baseball
game.116
Beginning in the 1980s, however, courts began to describe the
Baseball Rule in very different terms. Rather than characterizing
the duty that teams owed to their spectators as that of reasonable
care, courts and commentators instead began to refer to the Base-
ball Rule as a “no duty” or “limited duty” rule.117 This mischaracter-
ization is unfortunate. 
ball.”).
115. See, e.g., Crane v. Kan. City Baseball & Exhibition Co., 153 S.W. 1076, 1077 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1913) (“[Defendants] were bound to exercise reasonable care, i.e., care commensurate to
the circumstances of the situation, to protect their patrons against injury.”); Curtis v.
Portland Baseball Club, 279 P. 277, 277 (Or. 1929) (“Under the law, defendant was obligated
to exercise reasonable care and diligence commensurate with the danger involved, to protect
its patrons from injury.”).
116. See supra notes 82-87 and accompanying text (discussing the traditional scope of the
Baseball Rule as modified by Brisson).
117. See, e.g., Rudnick v. Golden W. Broads., 202 Cal. Rptr. 900, 905 (Ct. App. 1984) (“A
baseball club complying with Quinn’s screening standard has fulfilled its limited duty to
spectators as a matter of law and is entitled to summary judgment.” (emphasis added));
Benejam, 635 N.W.2d at 220 (characterizing the Baseball Rule as a “‘limited duty’ rule” under
which “a baseball stadium owner is not liable for injuries to spectators that result from
projectiles leaving the field during play if safety screening has been provided behind home
plate and there are a sufficient number of protected seats to meet ordinary demand”); Turner
v. Mandalay Sports Entm’t, LLC, 180 P.3d 1172, 1173 (Nev. 2008) (“We conclude that stadi-
um owners and operators have a limited duty to protect against ... injuries” caused by foul
balls); Friedman v. Hous. Sports Ass’n, 731 S.W.2D 572, 574 (Tex. App. 1987) (“Virtually all
jurisdictions have adopted the limited duty of stadium owners to screen certain seats, and
have held that where there is a screened area for the protection of spectators, and a fan elects
to sit in an unscreened area, liability will be precluded even though injury arises.” (emphasis
added)).
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As originally formulated, the Baseball Rule was best understood
as an ex ante, bright-line rule establishing the standard duty of rea-
sonable care that was required given the characteristics of the
sport.118 Indeed, the doctrine was originally intended to balance two
competing policy objectives: (i) providing a sufficiently safe environ-
ment for fans wishing to be protected from the dangers of errant
balls and bats; and (ii) allowing teams to meet the demand of the
large number of fans who desire unobstructed views of the playing
field, often in hopes of potentially catching a foul ball.119 Courts be-
lieved that their original formulation of the Baseball Rule reason-
ably balanced these objectives given the relative degree of risk that
errant balls or bats posed at the time.120 Thus, far from establishing
a “limited” or “lesser” duty of care for professional baseball teams,
the doctrine was instead originally intended to delineate how the
standard duty of reasonable care ought to be applied to the profes-
sional baseball industry given the inherent dangers of the sport.
Unfortunately, the subsequent mischaracterization of the Base-
ball Rule by modern courts has created the erroneous impression
that the doctrine imposes only a narrow burden on professional
teams to protect their spectators. For instance, interpreted properly,
the requirement that teams install netting to protect their stadi-
ums’ “most dangerous area” imposes a flexible standard, one that is
adaptable as future changes in the way the game is played increase
the danger present to fans sitting in different sections of the ball-
park. Indeed, in a typical negligence case, having defined a team’s
duty as providing netting in front of the most dangerous area of the
stadium, the question of whether the defendant breached that stan-
dard would normally be one of fact.121 The resulting factual inquiry
118. Cf. Stephen D. Sugarman, Assumption of Risk, 31 VAL. U. L. REV. 833, 837 (1997)
(“[W]hile spectator foul ball injuries are a regrettable by-product of baseball, they are gen-
erally not injuries that we should blame on the stadium operators because there was nothing
careless about their behavior.”).
119. See supra notes 69-72 and accompanying text (discussing the manner in which the
Wells court balanced the competing interests in fan safety and consumer demand for
unobstructed seating).
120. See, e.g., Wells v. Minneapolis Baseball & Athletic Ass’n, 142 N.W. 706, 708 (Minn.
1913) (“Baseball is not free from danger to those witnessing the game. But the perils are not
so imminent that due care on the part of the management requires all the spectators to be
screened in.”).
121. See, e.g., W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 37,
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would then typically give specific consideration to a variety of fac-
tors, such as the extent of the stadium’s existing netting, the prox-
imity of unprotected seats to home plate, and the history of previous
injuries in the seating area in question.122 In fact, in Wells, the trial
court was ordered to conduct just such an analysis on remand in one
of the original Baseball Rule cases decided all the way back in
1913.123
Rather than engage in such a factual inquiry to determine which
areas of the ballpark actually pose the greatest risk to fans, how-
ever, modern courts have instead summarily concluded that the
danger to fans is most acutely present—and thus that protection
was only required—simply in the area immediately behind home
plate.124 Far from basing this interpretation of the “most dangerous
area” of the stadium on any actual data, courts have instead
reached this inference on an entirely conclusory basis.125 As the
court in Coronel v. Chicago White Sox stated, for example, “[t]he
most dangerous part of a ball park is universally recognized as the
area behind home plate.”126 Rather than cite any empirical evidence
showing that this was, in fact, the only portion of the stadium that
posed a heightened risk to fans, the Coronel court instead relied on
citations to several prior decisions from other jurisdictions.127
at 237 (5th ed. 1984); cf. Stephen D. Sugarman, Misusing the “No Duty” Doctrine in Torts
Decisions: Following the Restatement (Third) of Torts Would Yield Better Decisions, 53
ALBERTA L. REV. 913, 929 (contending that in foul-ball cases, courts should “apply[ ] the nor-
mal ‘reasonable care’ standard to ball parks, taking each case up on its own and giving ball-
parks strong protection on a case-by-case basis if their protected seating area conforms to
industry custom”).
122. See infra Part IV.B (discussing how to better define “the most dangerous area”).
123. Wells, 142 N.W. at 709 (concluding that “the question of defendant’s negligence” de-
pended on the question of whether “the screen should [have] extend[ed] beyond the place
plaintiff chose for her seat,” or alternatively if “the ordinarily prudent person would deem
[the screen to have been] of sufficient size to afford reasonable protection”).
124. See, e.g., Yates v. Chi. Nat’l League Ball Club, Inc., 595 N.E.2d 570, 580 (Ill. App. Ct.
1992) (“[W]e note that numerous courts have recognized the area behind home plate as the
most dangerous area of the ballpark.”); see also Lawson ex rel. Lawson v. Salt Lake Trappers,
Inc., 901 P.2d 1013, 1015 (Utah 1995) (“[W]e hold that the Trappers had a duty to screen the
area behind home plate.”); Coronel v. Chi. White Sox, Ltd., 595 N.E.2d 45, 47 (Ill. App. Ct.
1992) (“The most dangerous part of a ball park is universally recognized as the area behind
home plate.”).
125. See, e.g.,  Yates, 595 N.E.2d at 580; Coronel, 595 N.E.2d at 47.
126. 595 N.E.2d at 47.
127.  Id. (citing City of Atlanta v. Merritt, 323 S.E.2d 680 (Ga. Ct. App. 1984); Clapman v.
City of New York, 468 N.E.2d 697, 697-98 (N.Y. 1984); Akins v. Glens Falls City Sch. Dist.,
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Meanwhile, none of these cited decisions themselves offered any
factual support for this conclusion; instead, they simply cited other
precedents that had also reached this conclusion on an entirely
circumstantial and conclusory basis.128
Thus, at no point has any modern court engaged in a factual
determination of which areas of a baseball stadium actually present
the greatest risk to fans.129 Nevertheless, modern courts routinely
treat the matter of identifying the sections of a ballpark that pre-
sent the greatest danger—and thus those which must be screened—
as having been conclusively and incontestably settled.130 Unfortu-
nately, as discussed in greater detail below,131 this overly narrow
and rigid interpretation of the Baseball Rule fails to account for re-
cent factual changes that have heightened the degree of risk posed
to fans sitting in sitting areas other than those immediately behind
home plate.
The mischaracterization of the Baseball Rule as being a “limited”
or “no” duty rule has helped to reinforce this artificially constrained
interpretation of a team’s duty to its fans.132 Once courts acceded
to an understanding of a baseball team’s legal obligation as being
substantially reduced compared to that which a business would
normally owe its patrons, it naturally followed that these same
courts would adhere to an overly narrow view of the level of pro-
tection that teams should be expected to provide to their specta-
tors.133 Conversely, if modern courts instead held that professional
baseball teams generally owe a standard duty of reasonable care to
their fans—in following with both the original Baseball Rule cases
and much of the rest of tort law134—then this doctrinaire insistence
424 N.E.2d 531, 533 (N.Y. 1981)).
128. See, e.g., Merritt, 323 S.E.2d at 682; Clapman, 468 N.E.2d at 697-98; Akins, 424
N.E.2d at 533.
129. See supra text accompanying notes 124-28.
130. See, e.g., Benejam v. Detroit Tigers, Inc., 635 N.W.2d 219, 221 (Mich. Ct. App. 2001)
(“The rule that emerges in these cases is that a stadium proprietor cannot be liable for
spectator injuries if it has satisfied a ‘limited duty’—to erect a screen that will protect the
most dangerous area of the spectator stands, behind home plate, and to provide a number of
seats in this area sufficient to meet the ordinary demand for protected seats.”).
131. See infra Parts II.A-B.
132. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
133. See supra notes 121-23 and accompanying text.
134. See supra Parts I.A-I.B.
84 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60:059
that teams must only protect the area immediately behind home
plate would be less tenable. Instead, courts would reasonably expect
teams to adjust the level of protection offered in light of the level of
risk that fans in each area of the ballpark actually face.
D. The Codification of the Baseball Rule
Finally, although the Baseball Rule is generally understood to be
a common law doctrine, in four jurisdictions—Arizona, Colorado,
Illinois, and New Jersey—the rule has actually been codified by
statute.135 In two of these jurisdictions—Illinois and New Jersey—
the state legislatures elected to codify the Baseball Rule after it had
been rejected (at least partially) by the judiciary;136 in the other two
instances, the legislatures simply appear to have decided to proac-
tively establish the doctrine as state law.137
While slight differences exist, these statutes typically state that
teams cannot be held liable for injuries caused by errant balls or
bats so long as the team has taken basic precautions—in line with
modern judicial formulations of the Baseball Rule—to protect their
fans.138 Arizona’s statute, for instance, specifies that a team will
not be liable for an injury if it offers a sufficient number of protect-
ed seats to meet expected demand,139 while New Jersey offers the
same insulation from liability to teams so long as they have in-
stalled netting protecting the most dangerous area of their stadi-
um (specifically identified by statute as being that behind home
135. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-554 (2018); Colorado Baseball Spectator Safety Act of
1993, COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-21-120 (West 2018); Baseball Facility Liability Act, 745 ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. 38/10 (West 2018); New Jersey Baseball Spectator Safety Act of 2006, N.J.
STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:53A-43-48 (West 2018).
136. See Lisa A. Lehrer, Limited Liability: Exculpatory Clauses, Statutory Protections and
Limited Duties, N.J. LAW. MAG., Feb. 2011, at 54, 59 (“The Maisonave holding has been
overruled to an extent by the New Jersey Baseball Spectator’s Safety Act of 2006.”); George
D. Turner, Note, Allocating the Risk of Spectator Injuries Between Basketball Fans and
Facility Owners, 6 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 156, 168 (2006) (“[T]he Illinois Baseball Facility
Liability Act ... superseded Coronel and Yates later that year.”).
137. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-554; COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-21-120.
138. See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
139. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-554(A)(1) (“An owner is not liable for injuries to spectators
who are struck by baseballs, baseball bats or other equipment used by players during a
baseball game unless the owner ... [d]oes not provide protective seating that is reasonably
sufficient to satisfy expected requests.”).
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plate).140 Meanwhile, Colorado limits a team’s liability so long as it
maintains its stadium “in reasonably safe condition relative to the
nature of the game,”141 the most flexible standard of the four. The
Colorado statute therefore potentially requires teams to adjust
their level of protection as emerging circumstances warrant.142
Illinois’s statute, on the other hand, provides teams with the broad-
est protection, establishing that they will not be liable for playing-
equipment-related fan injuries unless the fan was sitting behind a
defective screen (i.e., defective in some manner other than size), or
was injured by willful or wanton conduct on the part of the team or
players.143 This protection from liability thus goes above and be-
yond that established judicially by the Baseball Rule, neither
requiring teams in Illinois to screen any particular part of their
stadium nor ensure that a sufficient number of protected seats are
available to meet anticipated demand.144
Thus, to the extent that the Baseball Rule is to be modified, in
these four states145—with the possible exception of Colorado146—
any change would have to be undertaken legislatively, rather than
through the judiciary.
II. THE RISK OF BEING INJURED AT PROFESSIONAL BASEBALL
GAMES HAS INCREASED IN RECENT YEARS
The fact that courts have, by and large, continued to adhere to the
Baseball Rule in such a rigid manner is somewhat surprising given
several important changes that have conspired in recent years to
increase the risk that foul balls (and, to a lesser extent, errant bats)
pose to fans. Indeed, differences in how the game has both been
played and watched over the past twenty-five years raise significant
140. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:53A-47(b) (imposing liability in cases where a team has “fail[ed]
to provide protection for spectators in the most dangerous sections of the stands. This limited
duty may be satisfied by having a net behind home plate”).
141. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-21-120(5)(a) (West 2018) (requiring teams to “to make a
reasonable and prudent effort to design, alter, and maintain the premises of the stadium in
reasonably safe condition relative to the nature of the game of baseball”).
142. See id.
143. 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 38/10 (West 2018).
144. Cf. id.
145. See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
146. See supra text accompanying notes 141-42.
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questions regarding the continued viability of the Baseball Rule, at
least as it has traditionally been applied by courts.147
A. Changes in Stadium Construction
To begin, fans attending professional baseball games today are,
by and large, sitting closer to the playing field than was the case
at any point during the twentieth century. This is because MLB
teams have constructed new ballparks at a dizzying pace over the
last quarter century, with twenty-one of the thirty major-league
teams currently playing in a stadium that was built since 1992.148
Similar building trends have occurred throughout minor-league
baseball as well.149 During this period, most teams have sought to
emulate the so-called “retro” style of ballpark first popularized by
the Baltimore Orioles with the opening of Oriole Park at Camden
Yards in 1992.150 Along with featuring unique, asymmetrically
shaped playing fields,151 a common hallmark of these retro-style
stadiums is their placement of fan seating in much closer proximity
147. Cf. Maisonave v. Newark Bears Prof ’l Baseball Club, Inc., 881 A.2d 700, 708 (N.J.
2005) (“[T]here is a ‘pragmatic difficulty [in] applying an old rule to a sport that has changed
tremendously in the last seventy years.’”) (quoting David Horton, Comment, Rethinking
Assumption of Risk and Sports Spectators, 51 UCLA L. REV. 339, 365-66 (2003)); Fried &
Ammon, Jr., supra note 67, at 54 (“Sport viewership has significantly changed over the years,
but most courts [applying the Baseball Rule] have yet to embrace this change.”).
148. See Jeff Goldberg, MLB Ballparks, From Oldest to Newest, BALLPARKDIGEST.COM
(Mar. 31, 2017), https://ballparkdigest.com/2017/03/31/mlb-ballparks-from-oldest-to-newest/
[https://perma.cc/LD3Q-ADAA] (listing current MLB stadiums chronologically by date of
opening).
149. See Michael Birch, Take Some Land for the Ball Game: Sports Stadiums, Eminent
Domain, and the Public Use Debate, 19 SPORTS L.J. 173, 187 (2012) (observing that “[t]he
construction of minor league sports stadiums has ... dramatically increased over the last
decade”); see also Jeff Friedman, Antitrust Exemption Vital for Minor League Survival: MLB
& Parent Clubs Must Put Money Behind 1991 Stadium Standards, 1 DEPAUL J. SPORTS L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 118, 119 (2003) (reporting that just between “1991 to 2001 ... seventy-one
new [minor-league] stadiums were built”).
150. See David L. Dobkin, Fair or Foul? Ballparks and Their Impact on Urban Revital-
ization, 41 REAL EST. REV. J. 1, 2 (2012) (“Baltimore’s Camden Yards, which opened in 1992,
inspired the third era of ballparks—the retro age.”); W.S. Miller, “What Do You Mean My
Facility Is Obsolete?”: How 21st Century Technology Could Change Sports Facility Develop-
ment, 10 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 335, 341 (2000) (“Most facilities have incorporated elements of
the retro-look popularized by Camden Yards.”).
151. See Dobkin, supra note 150, at 2 (“The Orioles designed the ballpark ... with unique
dimensions, historic architecture and an outfield open to views of the city.”).
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to the field than had previously been the case.152 Indeed, because
teams are not subject to liability for most fan injuries under the
Baseball Rule, clubs have had little incentive to balance fan safety
with seating proximity, thus leading teams to chase profits by
putting fans ever closer to the action.153
In order to determine precisely how much closer to the field fans
are sitting today, data were marshalled to empirically establish the
extent to which MLB stadium design has changed over the years.
Specifically, relying on stadium dimension data gathered and main-
tained online by Andrew Clem,154 the yearly average of both (1) the
distance between home plate and the wall immediately behind it
(i.e., the “backstop”), and (2) the overall amount of foul territory
within the stadium, were calculated for all MLB ballparks in use
from 1920 to the present. While data regarding the precise distance
between home plate and the first row of each ballpark’s unprotected
seating were, unfortunately, not available, the data presented below
nevertheless clearly establish that fans are sitting closer to the field
than ever before.155 For instance, the data regarding the distance
between home plate and the backstop reflects the proximity of what
will typically be the closest seat to home plate,156 thus serving as a
useful proxy for the distance between home plate and the nearest
unprotected seat. Indeed, anecdotal data suggest that the distance
from home plate to the backstop has traditionally been only a few
feet shorter than the distance between home plate and the first row
of unprotected seating further down the foul lines.157 Meanwhile, the
152. See Goldberg, supra note 148 (noting that Camden Yards “ushered in the era of retro
ballparks” in part by featuring “seats close to the field”).
153. See Kent Greenfield, MLB Teams Should Pay for Fan Injuries, BOS. GLOBE (June 10,
2015), https://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2015/06/10/mlb-teams-should-pay-for-fan-injuries/
NGlssjUp5vFY3pVmA8JasI/story.html [https://perma.cc/H7GJ-BLNR] (“[B]ecause baseball
teams are freed of any financial risk, they need not make hard judgments that balance the
fans’ experience with their safety. They can generate money by making the game seem more
intimate. That includes building seats closer to the action and minimizing protective netting
that obscures views — without suffering a downside.”).
154. See CLEM’S BASEBALL: STADIUM STATISTICS, http://www.andrewclem.com/Baseball/
Stadium_statistics.html [https://perma.cc/E4TK-H8TM].
155. See id.
156. See id.
157. For example, in Globe Life Park, the current ballpark of the Texas Rangers, the
backstop is fifty-two feet from home plate, see id., and the first row of seats on the first and
third base sides are fifty-six feet, eight inches from home plate, a difference of four feet, eight
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decrease in the overall amount of foul territory within each stadium
further establishes the extent to which fans are sitting closer to the
playing field, as the shorter the distance grows between the first
row of seating and the playing field, the less foul territory will exist.
Figure A. Average Distance Between Home Plate and the 
Backstop
With regards to the average distance between home plate and the
backstop, the data reveal that fans today are sitting approximately
21 percent closer to the field on average than they were back in
1920, shortly after courts first established the Baseball Rule.158 As
depicted in Figure A above, whereas the average backstop distance
at MLB stadiums was just over sixty-five feet from home plate in
1920, today that distance has decreased to just under fifty-two
feet.159 Much of this decline occurred during two intervals in parti-
cular, both periods of substantial stadium construction. Between
1962 and 1977, teams constructed sixteen new MLB ballparks,160
during which time the average MLB backstop distance declined
inches. See Texas Rangers, Facts and Figures, TEXASRANGERS.COM, http://texas.rangers.mlb.
com/tex/ballpark/information/index.jsp?content=facts_figures [https://perma.cc/6TDK-X3DF].
This difference is similar to the dimensions for Arlington Stadium, the Texas Rangers’s old
ballpark, which had a backstop length of sixty feet and a distance of sixty-four feet from the
first row of seats along the first and third base sides to home plate. See id.
158. See CLEM’S BASEBALL: STADIUM STATISTICS, supra note 154.
159. See supra Figure A.
160. See CLEM’S BASEBALL: STADIUM MILESTONES, http://www.andrewclem.com/Baseball/
Stadium_milestones.html [https://perma.cc/T9DV-ECCJ].
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from over sixty-five feet—where it had remained relatively static
since 1920—to just over fifty-eight feet, a decrease of 11 percent.161
This trend continued from 1992 to present during the construction
of the retro ballparks, when the average distance between home
plate and the backstop dropped another six feet, again represent-
ing an 11 percent decline.162
The data regarding the yearly average amount of foul territory
establish a comparable trend, as depicted in Figure B below.163 For
most of the period from 1920 to 1960, MLB stadiums averaged
around 29,000 square feet of total foul territory.164 While the
construction boom from 1962 to 1977 decreased this territory slight-
ly—to an average of around 27,000 square feet, a decrease of 7 per-
cent—this trend has accelerated much more rapidly since 1992.165
Indeed, today the average amount of foul territory at MLB ballparks
totals around 23,500 square feet, a decrease of 21 percent since
1920, and representing a fairly precipitous decline of another 13
percent over the last twenty-five years.166
Figure B. Average Amount of Foul Territory
Thus, by both metrics, fans attending MLB games today are
sitting in much closer proximity to the playing field than was the
161. See id.
162. See id.
163. See infra Figure B.
164. See CLEM’S BASEBALL: STADIUM STATISTICS, supra note 154.
165. See id.; CLEM’S BASEBALL: STADIUM MILESTONES, supra note 160.
166. CLEM’S BASEBALL: STADIUM STATISTICS, supra note 154.
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case one hundred, or even just twenty-five, years ago.167 Moreover,
the fact that the overall foul territory has declined more precip-
itously over the last quarter century than has the distance to the
backstop168 suggests that a disproportionate part of this recent
change has resulted from a decline in the distance between unpro-
tected seats and home plate.169
From an injury prevention standpoint, the fact that fans today
are sitting 21 percent closer to the playing field than a century
ago170 means that, all else remaining static, spectators have approx-
imately 21 percent less time to react to a ball hit in their direction
than would have been the case around the time that the Baseball
Rule was first established. This makes the prospect of attending a
professional baseball game substantially more dangerous today
than it was one hundred years ago, at least for those fans seated in
relatively close proximity to the playing field.
For example, assuming that the first row of unprotected seating
in a stadium has historically been approximately five feet further
away from home plate than the closest seat behind the backstop—as
the anecdotal evidence cited above suggests171—then a fan in the
first exposed row in 1920 would have been sitting around seventy
feet from home plate, while a similarly situated fan today would be
just fifty-seven feet away. For a foul ball hit at 80 miles per hour,
this means that a fan in 1920 would have had around six-tenths of
a second to shield themselves from the ball, while a fan today would
have less than one-half of a second to react.172
While the difference of one-tenth of a second may not appear to
be particularly significant, in terms of injury avoidance even this
short an amount of time can be critical.173 The average human
reaction time to visual stimuli is around .248 seconds, but varies
167. See supra Figures A, B.
168. Cf. supra text accompanying notes 162-66.
169. Because overall foul territory represents the total square footage of the space between
the playing field and seating areas of a stadium, a slower decrease in backstop distance
inherently means that sections of seats other than those screened areas immediately behind
home plate must be moving closer to the field at a faster rate.
170. See CLEM’S BASEBALL: STADIUM STATISTICS, supra note 154.
171. See supra note 157 (discussing data from two ballparks currently and previously used
by the Texas Rangers).
172. A ball hit at 80 miles per hour travels approximately 117 feet per second.
173. See infra text accompanying notes 177-80.
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depending on an individual’s age, gender, handedness, physical
conditioning, and level of fatigue.174 However, that average rate
accounts merely for the amount of time that an individual needs to
mentally process a visually perceived danger, and does not necessar-
ily encompass all of the subsequent time that it may take to move
one’s hands, arms, and/or body to avoid injury.175 In the context of
avoiding a foul ball, for instance, one expert has estimated that a
reaction time of less than one full second would give a fan “virtually
no time to react” to a particularly hard-hit foul ball.176
B. Changes in the Way the Game is Played
Unfortunately, the reaction times stated above—based on a foul
ball traveling at 80 miles per hour—almost certainly understate the
potential danger that fans experience today. While comprehensive
data on the velocity of foul balls is unfortunately not available, an-
ecdotal data suggest that baseballs enter the stands traveling at
speeds of 100 to 110 miles per hour on a relatively frequent basis.177
174. See Aditya Jain et al., A Comparative Study of Visual and Auditory Reaction Times
on the Basis of Gender and Physical Activity Levels of Medical First Year Students, 5 INT’L J.
APPLIED BASIC MED. RES. 124, 125 (2015), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC
4456887/ [https://perma.cc/VXY2-HPPZ] (reporting same). While the study cited above
measures the reaction time of a sample of medical students responding to the appearance of
a visual stimulus on a computer screen, its results are consistent with other studies based on
a broader range of test subjects. See, e.g., Reaction Time Test, HUMAN BENCHMARK, https://
www.humanbenchmark.com/tests/reactiontime/ [https://perma.cc/DQH3-NN4Q] (stating that
the “average human reaction time may fall between 200-250 [milliseconds]”).
175. Cf. Jain et al., supra note 174.
176. See Costa v. Bos. Red Sox Baseball Club, 809 N.E.2d 1090, 1091 (Mass. App. Ct. 2004)
(reporting that the plaintiff ’s expert witness testified that “the plaintiff had virtually no time
to react to [a] ball” that hit her “no more than 1.07 seconds from the time” it left the bat).
177. See, e.g., Baseball Fans Deserve More Protection from Foul Balls, CHI. TRIB. (Oct. 17,
2017, 2:43 PM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/opinion/editorials/ct-edit-baseball-foul-
balls-netting-20171013-story.html [https://perma.cc/LJ5Q-SKWJ] (“When Anthony Rizzo, Kris
Bryant and Kyle Schwarber connect at the plate, their exit velocity—the speed at which the
ball leaves the bat—often exceeds 100 mph.”); see also Matthews, supra note 2 (reporting that
Todd Frazier hit a foul ball at 106 mph); Carrie Muskat (@CarrieMuskat), TWITTER (Sept. 13,
2017, 6:49 PM), https://twitter.com/CarrieMuskat/status/908145691104628736 [https://perma.
cc/JS23-ESS2] (noting that the Chicago Cubs’s Anthony Rizzo hit a foul ball that entered the
stands travelling 110 miles per hour); Daren Willman (@darenw), TWITTER (Mar. 7, 2017, 2:45
PM), https://twitter.com/darenw/status/839245696020598784 [https://perma.cc/JYZ3-NVQN]
(reporting that the Oakland Athletics’s Renato Nunez had just hit a foul ball at 110 miles per
hour). See generally Goplerud & Terry, supra note 37, at 460 (observing in 2003 that “[f]oul
balls enter the spectator areas at speeds upward of eighty to one hundred miles per hour”).
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At 110 miles per hour, a spectator seated sixty feet from home plate
would have just four-tenths of a second to react to a foul ball, giving
even those fans paying extremely close attention to the action on the
field virtually no chance of avoiding injury.178 Indeed, at four-tenths
of a second the hypothetical fan described above would actually
have less time to react than MLB batters have to avoid being hit by
a 95 mile-per-hour fastball.179 If elite professional athletes of this
caliber are often unable to get out of the way of such a fast-moving
projectile,180 it should come as no surprise that fan injuries from foul
balls have become even more common occurrences than batters
being hit by a pitch in recent years.181
Although precise data are again unfortunately not available, the
frequency with which foul balls are hit at 100 or more miles per
hour has likely increased over the last few decades, for several
reasons. For one thing, baseball players today are widely regarded
as being in much better physical condition than was the case fifty or
one hundred years ago.182 Because the average batter today is
almost certainly physically stronger than in prior eras,183 players
178. See supra notes 174-75 (discussing average human reaction time).
179. See Scott Simon, How a Baseball Batter’s Brain Reacts to a Fast Pitch, NPR (Sept. 3,
2016, 8:50 AM), https://www.npr.org/2016/09/03/492516937/how-a-baseball-batters-brain-
reacts-to-a-fast-pitch [https://perma.cc/8LGK-R9GP] (“[F]rom the release of the pitch until it
gets to the plate, a 95-mile-an-hour fastball is around 425-450 milliseconds.”).
180. See Ed Edmonds, Baseball Needs to Reduce the Risk of Fan Injury, CHI. TRIB. (Aug.
24, 2015, 4:18 PM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/opinion/commentary/ct-baseball-
fans-injuries-mlb-bat-line-drive-ball-perspec-0825-jm-20150824-story.html [https://perma.cc/
9PMK-KSUX] (“Pitchers can’t react fast enough on the mound. How’s a fan going to react? ...
They can’t.”); Catherine Slonksnis, Players Rip MLB for Not Taking Fan Safety More
Seriously, SBNATION (Aug. 24, 2015, 9:53 AM), https://www.sbnation.com/2015/8/22/9192
269/mlb-fan-safety-netting-detroit-tigers-boston-red-sox [https://perma.cc/5C3K-LPSE] (“We
can’t react that fast in the dugout, and we’re paying attention to the game ... A fan who’s
never seen anything moving that fast at them in their life? No chance. Zero chance in this
world, a fan sitting right there over the dugout could react.”).
181. See Glovin, supra note 7 (comparing the rate of foul-ball injuries to batters being hit
by pitches).
182. See, e.g., Horton, supra note 147, at 343-44 (“[N]ew training techniques and tech-
nologies have made play faster and players stronger.”); Zachary D. Rymer, Why Today’s Base-
ball Players Don’t Have the Same Skills as Old-Timers, BLEACHER REP. (Sept. 16, 2012), http://
bleacherreport.com/articles/1334652-why-todays-baseball-players-don’t-have-the-same-skills-
as-old-timers [https://perma.cc/GE6J-3BMX] (“Modern ballplayers are bigger, faster and
stronger than the old-timers, and they throw the ball faster, hit it harder and field it better.”).
183. See Rick Weiner, Monumental Differences Between Today’s Baseball Players and Those
of Yesteryear, BLEACHER REP. (Mar. 4, 2013), http://bleacherreport.com/articles/1549854-
monumental-differences-between-todays-baseball-player-and-those-of-yesteryear [https://
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today will typically be able to swing their bats both faster and hard-
er than before, with the result that balls now likely often fly further
and more quickly into the stands than was the case at the time
courts first established the Baseball Rule.184
Figure C. Average Fastball Velocity for MLB Pitchers
At the same time, pitchers are also throwing harder today than
ever before, with the average fastball velocity increasing across
MLB by nearly 3 miles per hour between 2002 and 2016, as depic-
ted in Figure C above.185 While this increased velocity itself in-
crementally increases the speed at which the ball is hit,186 perhaps
perma.cc/T2AT-9BMY].
184. See Neil Paine, Here’s What 56,785 Homers Look Like on a Map, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT
(July 17, 2017), https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/how-far-did-56785-home-runs-travel/
[https://perma.cc/58DX-85EV] (finding that through only 55 percent of the 2017 MLB season,
hitters had hit the ball an aggregated distance equal to 69 percent of the total distance for an
average complete MLB season).
185. This data was presented in Jeff Zimmerman, Velocity’s Relationship with Pitcher Arm
Injuries, HARDBALL TIMES (Apr. 22, 2015), https://www.fangraphs.com/tht/velocitys-relation
ship-with-pitcher-arm-injuries/ [https://perma.cc/WA4V-R8JA]. While league-wide pitch velo-
city data was not collected prior to 2002, anecdotal evidence suggests that pitch velocities
have been increasing for decades. See, e.g., Jayson Stark, The Age of the Pitcher, ESPN.COM
(June 15, 2012), http://www.espn.com/mlb/story/_/id/8048897/the-age-pitcher-how-got-here-
mlb [https://perma.cc/D3XC-XZQH] (quoting John Mirabelli, former Vice President of Scouting
for the Cleveland Indians, as stating, “[w]hen I first started doing this 25 years ago, if you saw
a kid touch 90 (mph) at 17 years old, you were like, ‘Oh my God’ ... Now, just about every guy
(on a scouting director’s radar) throws 90, and most of them throw 92. And you never saw
amateur guys throwing in the upper 90s. Now you see it all the time. It’s unbelievable.”).
186. Physicists have determined that pitch velocity accounts for around 15 percent of speed
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more importantly, the faster a pitch is thrown, the less likely a bat-
ter is to hit it squarely with his bat.187 Consequently, as pitching
speeds have increased, so too have the odds that a batter will mis-
hit a ball, sending it into the stands at an elevated speed.188
Taken together, then, recent trends in MLB stadium construction,
along with changes in the way the game is played on the field, have
converged to place spectators at a greater risk of injury than was
the case just twenty-five years ago.189 Even if a fan sitting in
relatively close proximity to the field today is paying full attention
to the game, she may nevertheless have little to no chance to avoid
a foul ball traveling in her direction.190 Indeed, the danger to fans
sitting in close proximity to home plate has become so pronounced
in recent years that the Major League Baseball Players Associa-
tion—the union representing all major-league players—has pressed
MLB team owners to enlarge the size of their stadiums’ protective
screening for over a decade during collective bargaining negotia-
tions.191
C. Changes to Ticket Policies
A third relevant difference worth noting with respect to the
continued viability of the Baseball Rule relates to the way in
which ticketing policies across professional baseball have changed
since the doctrine was first established in 1913. In most of the
initial cases applying the doctrine, plaintiffs had purchased general
with which a ball leaves the bat. See Joe Lemire, Exit Velocity Proves Pitchers Provide
Minimal Power to Long Balls, USA TODAY (Sept. 22, 2015, 1:21 AM), https://www.usatoday.
com/story/sports/mlb/2015/09/22/exit-velocity-harder-a-pitch-comes-in-the-harder-it-goes-
out/72624244/ [https://perma.cc/8J4D-6UQG] (quoting Alan Nathan, physics professor emer-
itus at the University of Illinois).
187. See id. (quoting Cleveland Indians pitcher Trevor Bauer as stating, “[i]f I throw 95 and
the guy’s 100% on time, it’s probably going to leave the bat harder than a pitch that’s 85
(when he’s) 100% on time, but the chances of being 100% on time at 95 are probably not as
good as being 100% on time at 85”).
188. See Takatoshi Higuchi et al., The Effect of Fastball Backspin Rate on Baseball Hitting
Accuracy, 29 J. APPLIED BIOMECHANICS 279, 283 (2013), https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/
4bbe/c7cdb2d4c061759bf4ad7476a35bf3068203.pdf [https://perma.cc/89SV-R9V3].
189. See supra Parts II.A-B.
190. See supra notes 175-76 and accompanying text.
191. See Lucchese, supra note 21, at 121 (noting that during negotiations for “the previous
two CBAs ... the players proposed [fan safety] improvements”).
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admission tickets granting them the right to sit in any unoccupied
seat in the applicable stadium’s grandstand.192 Thus, in most early
Baseball Rule cases, fans had the ability to choose a seat for
themselves upon entering the stadium, and therefore could make a
more informed choice as to whether to sit behind the protective
netting or instead view the game from an unscreened location.193
Today, however, seats at professional baseball games are sold
almost exclusively on a reserved basis, meaning that a fan’s ticket
specifies the exact seat in which she must sit.194 As a result, spec-
tators today do not have the same opportunity to select a location
from which to view the game upon entering the stadium as was
taken for granted in the early Baseball Rule cases. At the same
time, because teams frequently fail to clearly identify whether a
particular seat is located behind the protective screen at the time a
ticket is purchased,195 fans in many cases may not be able to defini-
tively ascertain whether the ticket they are purchasing will entitle
them to sit in a seat shielded from the playing field.
Moreover, the public availability of protected seats is often much
more limited today than was the case one hundred years ago.196 At
most MLB stadiums, a large percentage of seats behind home plate
are sold exclusively in season-ticket packages, and as a result are
192. See, e.g., Crane v. Kan. City Baseball & Exhibition Co., 153 S.W. 1076, 1077 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1913) (noting that plaintiff ’s general admission ticket gave him “the option of seating
himself at some place behind the netting or in an unprotected seat”).
193. See id.
194. See Buying Tickets to Baseball Games Online, MLB.COM, http://mlb.mlb.com/mlb/help/
faq_buying_tickets.jsp [https://perma.cc/4S69-WNWF] (“You can select a seat according to a
stadium seating chart.”). But see Introducing the Pinstripe Pass, MLB.COM, https://www.mlb.
com/yankees/tickets/specials/pinstripe-pass [https://perma.cc/44KE-MB3C] (“The Pinstripe
Pass ... includes a general admission ticket to the [New York Yankees’s] Stadium ... and ac-
cess to non-designated standing room only locations throughout the Stadium.”).
195. While some teams identify which seating sections are behind a net, others do not.
Compare Comerica Park Map, TIGERS.COM, https://www.mlb.com/tigers/ballpark/netting
[https://perma.cc/AJY7-HU7Y] (listing sections that are entirely or partially protected by a
screen), with Angel Stadium Seating Map, ANGELS.COM, http://losangeles.angels.mlb.
com/ana/ticketing/seating.jsp [https://perma.cc/SP7Z-PZDF] (providing no indication of which
seats are protected by netting). Meanwhile, few, if any, teams allow fans to search for seats
based on their protected status when purchasing tickets online.
196. See Gil Fried et al., Don’t Sit There...or There...or There: An Analysis of Ball Park
Protection and Foul Ball Injury Risks, 13 INT’L J. SPORT MGMT. 423, 423 (2012) (“At major
league baseball games there might be very few seats available in a screened area that are
either available for concerned fans or are reasonably priced enough to represent a viable
option for concerned fans.”).
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rarely available to fans on a single-game or day-to-day basis.197
Meanwhile, even when protected seats are currently available for
purchase, they will often prove to be cost-prohibitive for many fans,
as the price of tickets immediately behind home plate has increased
exponentially from the time that the Baseball Rule was first es-
tablished.198 In the seminal case of Crane v. Kansas City Baseball &
Exhibition Co., for example, the plaintiff had purchased his grand-
stand ticket for $0.50, the equivalent of $12.62 in today’s dollars.199
In contrast, the overall average ticket price for an MLB game today
is $31, while the price for a seat immediately behind home plate can
often exceed $100.200 In 2017, for instance, a box seat behind home
plate at Boston’s Fenway Park averaged around $150 per game,201
while a similar seat at New York’s Yankee Stadium ranged from
$128 to $300 per ticket as of April 2018.202
Consequently, fans today do not have the same ability to select a
protected seat for themselves as was taken for granted by courts at
the time the Baseball Rule was first formulated over a century ago.
Not only are seats behind the protective net often unavailable to
fans buying tickets on a single-game basis,203 but even when they
197. See Fried & Ammon Jr., supra note 67, at 59 (“Spectators can be precluded from these
sections based on ... long-term contracts to secure seat location.”); Khare, supra note 22, at 99
(“Seats behind home plate ... are almost never readily available to consumers unless they are
season ticket holders who are given first priority.”).
198. See Khare, supra note 22, at 99 (“[T]he prices on premium seats have increased dra-
matically ... [s]eats behind home plate, for instance, have become the most expensive seating
area at a baseball game.”).
199. 153 S.W. 1076, 1077 (Mo. App. Ct. 1913); see also U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LA-
BOR STATISTICS, DATABASES, TABLES, & CALCULATORS BY SUBJECT: CPI INFLATION CAL-
CULATOR, https://www.bls.gov/data/inflation_calculator.htm [https://perma.cc/ZC2P-7AXD].
200. See, e.g., Average MLB Ticket Price by Team in 2017, STATISTA, https://www. statista.
com/statistics/193673/average-ticket-price-in-the-mlb-by-team/ [https://perma.cc/2VQD-6KEU]
(“During the 2016 MLB season, the league-wide average ticket price stood at 31 U.S.
dollars.”).
201. See Boston Report, Red Sox to Increase 2018 Ticket Prices by 2.5 Percent, NBC SPORTS
(Sept. 27, 2017, 2:09 PM), http://www.nbcsports.com/boston/boston-red- sox/red-sox- increase-
2018-ticket- prices-25- percent [https://perma.cc/8L5G-8H62] (taking the average of the Field
Box prices for 2017 to get the average cost for seats behind home plate at Fenway Park).
202. See 2018 Individual Game Pricing, YANKEES.COM, https://www.mlb.com/yankees/
tickets/pricing [https://perma.cc/PWR5-23TG] (taking the range of New York Yankees’s Field
Level tickets directly behind home plate on the accompanying interactive map as of April
2018).
203. See supra note 197 and accompanying text.
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are available, adjusted for inflation such tickets frequently cost
eight times as much, or more, than they did in 1913.204
D. Increased Spectator Distractions
Finally, fans attending professional baseball games today face a
plethora of potential distractions that did not exist decades ago. At
the time courts first established the Baseball Rule, the experience
of attending a game was vastly different than it is today, with the
game itself serving not just as the primary entertainment, but as
the only attraction offered.205 In contrast, baseball games today are
increasingly marketed as multifaceted entertainment experiences,
offering spectators a variety of additional stimuli potentially dis-
tracting their attention from the action on the field.206
For instance, most professional stadiums today feature large,
colorful, video-enhanced scoreboards that compete for fans’ atten-
tion by presenting a never-ending stream of statistics, adver-
tisements, and replays, often all in spectacular high definition.207
Similarly, over the last four to five decades, most professional teams
began employing boisterous team mascots to entertain fans
throughout the game.208 While these mascots conduct a number of
in-game promotions during breaks in the action—such as t-shirt or
hot-dog tosses209—they may also interact with, or perform for, fans
even while the game is transpiring on the field.210 Perhaps even
204. See supra notes 199-202 and accompanying text.
205. See Fried & Ammon Jr., supra note 67, at 54-55 (“Fans are enthralled by a com-
prehensive experience ranging from doing the wave, to between innings games, to watching
other distractions.”).
206. See Tom Verducci, Safety Squeeze: With New Ballparks Putting Spectators Closer than
Ever to the Action, More Fans Are Getting in Harm’s Way, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Apr. 1, 2002,
at 64, 65 (noting that modern ballparks “present a sensory overload of distractions, from
vendors hawking food to scoreboards full of information and video diversions”); see also Fried
& Ammon Jr., supra note 67, at 56-57.
207. See Kenneth R. Swift, I Couldn’t Watch the Ball Because I Was Watching the Ferris
Wheel in Centerfield, 22 ENT. & SPORTS LAW., 2005, at 1, 34 (“Fans now have ... huge score-
boards [running] crazy promotions.”).
208. Cf. Robert M. Jarvis & Phyllis Coleman, Hi-Jinks at the Ballpark: Costumed Mascots
in the Major Leagues, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 1635, 1656 (2002) (noting that in 1964, “Mr. Met
was brought to life as major league baseball’s first costumed mascot”).
209. See Kitei, supra note 100, at 53.
210. Cf. Howard W. Brill & Christian H. Brill, Baseball Mascots and the Law, 65 U. KAN.
L. REV. 105, 107-08 (2016) (observing that a team’s mascot will “entertain fans between
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more dangerous, MLB teams now routinely encourage spectators to
use their smartphones during the game, offering free Wi-Fi to fans
in order to allow them to order food and interact with the team on
social media in real time via the “MLB Ballpark” mobile appli-
cation.211
Consequently, while spectators could historically be expected to
occasionally take their eyes off the field to look around the stadium
or converse with friends, expecting a fan today to pay particularly
close attention to every pitch of a game is much less realistic than
was the case a century ago. As a result, for a variety of reasons, fans
attending professional baseball games today are exposed to a high-
er risk of injury than at any point in time since courts first estab-
lished the Baseball Rule in 1913.
III. COURTS HAVE FAILED TO ADAPT THE BASEBALL
RULE TO CHANGING LEGAL DOCTRINE
Not only have courts continued to adhere to the Baseball Rule
over the last one hundred years despite the increased risk that
errant balls and bats pose to fans,212 but they have also curiously
elected to persist in abiding by the century-old doctrine despite
intervening changes in the underlying law of torts, transformations
that arguably undercut continued reliance on the doctrine.
A. The Rise of the Law-and-Economics Movement
First, modern courts applying the Baseball Rule have uniformly
failed to consider whether continued adherence to the doctrine is
warranted in light of the important insights that the law-and-eco-
nomics movement has contributed to tort law. In the years since the
1970 publication of then-Professor Guido Calabresi’s seminal book
The Cost of Accidents,213 both academic commentators and courts
innings [and] greet children in the stands”).
211. See The Official Ballpark App, MLB.COM, http://www.mlb.com/apps/ballpark/ [https://
perma.cc/XC82-98VZ] (discussing the app’s functionality); see also Fried & Ammon Jr., supra
note 67, at 57 (reporting that as early as 2000, teams had begun to allow fans to order food
via “Palm Pilots or similar devices”).
212. See supra Parts I-II.
213. GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (1970).
2018] LAW AND ECONOMICS OF THE “BASEBALL RULE” 99
have significantly altered their understanding of the manner in
which tort liability can most efficiently be applied.214 Perhaps most
significantly, law-and-economics scholars realized that tort law
could be better used to encourage parties to act in ways that max-
imize aggregate social welfare by incentivizing them to take steps
“to reduce the sum of the costs of accidents.”215 Along these lines,
economic analyses of tort law suggested that the optimum standard
for negligence cases is one that imposes liability on whichever party
was the lowest cost, or best risk, avoider.216 In other words, when
deciding what level of reasonable care is required under the circum-
stances in a given negligence case, courts should consider whether
the injury could have most efficiently been avoided by the plaintiff
or the defendant. By doing so, courts can allocate liability in a way
that increases the likelihood the parties will adopt the optimal level
of precaution necessary in a given case, thus minimizing the over-
all social cost of accidents.217
Unfortunately, modern courts have failed to consider or apply this
insight when deciding cases under the Baseball Rule.218 Had these
courts undertaken an economic analysis of the doctrine, they would
have likely concluded that in most cases the defendant team was
the lowest cost or best risk avoider, as teams (rather than their
214. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Guido Calabresi’s The Costs of Accidents: A Reassessment,
64 MD. L. REV. 12, 14 (2005) (noting the book’s “landmark status” evidenced by the fact it has
been cited nearly 1,000 times in the scholarly literature, along with sixty citations in judicial
decisions). 
215. CALABRESI, supra note 213, at 26.
216. See, e.g., Herbert Hovenkamp, Positivism in Law & Economics, 78 CALIF. L. REV. 815,
828 (1990) (“[A]n optimal negligence rule will ordinarily place liability on the lowest cost-
avoider.”); Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and Uncon-
scionability, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1203, 1284 (2003) (“[E]fficient allocations usually assign risks
to the party best able to avoid a potential loss or able to avoid the loss most cheaply, in order
to provide the maximum incentive for that party to take the necessary precautions.”).
217. See Yoed Halbersberg & Ehud Guttel, Behavioral Economics and Tort Law, in THE
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 405, 407-08 (Eyal Zamir &
Doron Teichman eds., 2014) (“[T]here exists an efficient level of precautions that minimizes
the overall social costs of the accident, such that taking either more or less care is socially
undesirable.”).
218. See, e.g., Costa v. Bos. Red Sox Baseball Club, 809 N.E.2d 1090, 1093 (Mass. App. Ct.
2004) (“[W]e are persuaded that the potential for a foul ball to enter the stands and injure a
spectator who is seated in an unscreened area is, as matter of law, sufficiently obvious that
the defendant reasonably could conclude that a person of ordinary intelligence would perceive
the risk.”).
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fans) will typically be best positioned to prevent—or otherwise
minimize the cost of—these accidents.219
To begin, many foul-ball-related injuries could easily be avoided
through the installation of additional safety netting at little cost to
the team.220 Indeed, professional-grade netting is relatively cheap
and easy to install, averaging around $8,000 to $12,000 per 60 feet,
and requiring only a few days to mount.221 Considering that MLB is
a $10-billion-per-year organization,222 such a cost is a drop in the
bucket for major-league teams, and is one that would almost im-
mediately be recouped once the expanded screen prevented even
just a single serious injury, the medical bills alone for which can
easily total more than $150,000.223 
While hard data regarding the number of fans who sustain such
costly injuries at professional baseball games each year is not avail-
able, several recent studies have estimated the frequency with
which these incidents occur.224 For instance, as noted previously, a
recent analysis by Bloomberg estimated that more than 1700 fans
are injured each year by foul balls at MLB games, a rate of two
people every three games, making foul-ball injuries a more frequent
occurrence than a batter being hit by a pitch.225 Meanwhile, a second
study recently determined that foul balls account for thirty-five
219. Cf. Horton, supra note 147, at 362 (“Stadium owners, who track the rate and severity
of injuries in different parts of their facilities, are better situated to avoid harm than fans.”).
220. See Lucchese, supra note 21, at 119-20.
221. See Chris Bumbaca, To Screen or Not to Screen? Debate on Added Netting at MLB
Parks Continues as Lawsuit Filed, KAN. CITY STAR (July 17, 2015, 5:59 PM), http://www.
kansascity.com/sports/mlb/kansas-city-royals/article27539521.html [https://perma.cc/LA65-
JFNN] (reporting that “installing additional netting in the name of enhanced safety is a
relatively inexpensive proposition—about $8,000 to $12,000 per stadium, according to one
vendor’s estimate”).
222. See Maury Brown, MLB Sees Record Revenues Approaching $10 Billion for 2016,
FORBES (Dec. 5, 2016, 3:22 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/maurybrown/2016/12/05/mlb-
sees-record-revenues-approaching-10-billion-for-2016/#5af077dc7088 [https://perma.cc/4MVZ-
TVFT].
223. See, e.g., Julia Marsh, Yankees Fan Hit in the Face by Foul Ball Loses Injury Lawsuit,
N.Y. POST (Oct. 24, 2017, 3:28 PM), https://nypost.com/2017/10/24/yankee-fan-hit-in-the-face-
by-foul-ball-loses-injury-lawsuit/ [https://perma.cc/8RH6-G64C] (stating that a man hit in
the eye by a foul ball at a New York Yankees game spent “$160,000 in medical bills for re-
constructive surgery”).
224. See, e.g., Wakamatsu, supra note 11, at 1.
225. Glovin, supra note 7.
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injuries per one million fans,226 a rate that would result in more
than 2500 fans being hurt each year at MLB games given the
league’s recent attendance levels.227 Importantly, neither study
attempted to account for foul-ball-related injuries sustained by the
forty million fans who attend minor-league games each season,228
roughly 950 to 1400 of whom could be expected to be hurt each year
given the injury rates estimated above.229 Not all of these injuries
will be of a particularly severe nature. But based on the results of
the second study referenced above, 7.5 percent of foul-ball injuries
ultimately require hospitalization,230 meaning that—given the
projected injury totals estimated above—nearly 300 people per year
may currently require hospital care to treat injuries inflicted by
flying objects leaving the field of play at professional baseball
games.231
While the societal cost of foul-ball injuries is thus likely to be
exponentially greater than the cost of installing extra screening,
that is not to suggest that the cost to the team of erecting additional
netting is necessarily limited to the purchase and installation price
of the screen. To the contrary, many spectators actively prefer to sit
in seats providing unobstructed views of the field, often in hopes of
catching a foul ball.232 Consequently, any significant enlargement of
226. See Wakamatsu, supra note 11, at 1 (“A Milsten study revealed that there are more
than 35 spectator injuries from foul balls at MLB games for every one million spectator
visits.”).
227. MLB attendance has approached or surpassed seventy-three million for each of the
last fifteen years. See Brown, supra note 222.
228. See Sickels, supra note 9 (reporting that more than forty-one million fans attended
minor-league baseball games in 2016).
229. The estimation was calculated by multiplying forty-one, to represent the forty-one
million fans who attend minor league baseball games each year, see id., by thirty-five, to
approximate the number of fans per one million fans to be injured by foul balls. See
Wakamatsu, supra note 11, at 1.
230. See Fried et al., supra note 196, at 439 (discussing results of the study by Milsten et
al.).
231. See supra notes 226-27 and accompanying text. At MLB games, at the 7.5 percent
hospitalization rate, see supra note 230 and accompanying text, approximately 190 fans may
require hospital care out of the 2500 fans injured each year. See supra notes 226-27 and
accompanying text. Additionally, approximately 105 minor league baseball fans out of the
1400 fans injured each year, see supra note 229 and accompanying text, may require hospital
care each year at the same hospital care rate. Together, approximately 300 fans will annually
require hospital care across professional and minor league games for injuries resulting from
foul balls.
232. See, e.g., Benejam v. Detroit Tigers, Inc., 635 N.W.2d 219, 222 (Mich. Ct. App. 2001)
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the size of the protective netting will result in some incremental
decrease in utility for a sizeable subset of fans.233 Due to recent
improvements in net technology, however, teams can install thinner
screens that present less of an obstruction to fans’ views of the field
while still providing more than suitable protection.234 Regardless, on
balance any reduction in overall social welfare resulting from sub-
jecting an increased number of fans to an obstructed view of the
field will typically be outweighed by the injury-reduction benefits
these screens provide, at least in those unprotected areas of the
stadium where fans are currently subjected to the highest degree of
risk.235 Indeed, despite the universal presence of safety netting,236
seats immediately behind home plate are often among a stadium’s
most expensive.237 This suggests that fans will continue to prioritize
proximity to the field over an unobstructed view, and will adjust to
the presence of additional netting.238
Not only will teams thus often prove to be the lowest-cost avoider
in cases involving foul-ball-related injuries, but they will also typi-
cally constitute the best-risk avoider in most cases as well. Unlike
(“[T]here is inherent value in having most seats unprotected by a screen because baseball
patrons generally want to be involved with the game in an intimate way and are even hoping
that they will come in contact with some projectile from the field (in the form of a souvenir
baseball).”); Garrett R. Broshuis, Death to the Crazy Hotdog Vendor? The Continued Erosion
of the Baseball Rule After Coomer v. Kansas City Royals, 31 ENT. & SPORTS LAW. 21, 22 (2014)
(“[M]any spectators actually want foul balls to enter the stands in the hopes of catching a
souvenir.”); Christopher McNair, Note, Edward C. v. City of Albuquerque: The New Mexico
Supreme Court Balks on the Baseball Rule, 41 N.M. L. REV. 539, 548-49 (2011) (“[M]any fans
attend baseball games hoping to catch foul balls and other souvenirs from the field of play.”).
233. See supra note 232 and accompanying text.
234. See Lucchese, supra note 21, at 119 (“Modern technology has made protective netting
thinner, stronger, last longer, and easier to see through than the netting used years ago.”).
235. The calculus may prove to be different in areas where the degree of risk is less acute.
See Benejam, 635 N.W.2d at 222 (“[T]here is inherent value in having most seats unprotected
by a screen because baseball patrons generally want to be involved with the game in an
intimate way and are even hoping that they will come in contact with some projectile from the
field (in the form of a souvenir baseball).”); see also Sugarman, supra note 118, at 836
(observing that such “precaution[ ] would deprive the fans of an important pleasure they ought
to be able to enjoy—seeing the game relatively up-close without the annoyance of having to
look through a screen”).
236. See infra note 309 and accompanying text.
237. See supra notes 198-202 and accompanying text.
238. See Ludden, supra note 11, at 138 (“[T]he fact [is] that some of the most expensive
seats at a baseball game—behind home plate—are covered by netting, which has not stopped
fans from paying top dollar for tickets in these areas on a daily basis.”).
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spectators, who have access to little to no public data regarding foul-
ball injury rates in particular seating locations, teams are better
positioned to track and study the rate at which fans are injured in
different sections of their stadiums.239 Indeed, through the use of
newly installed optical camera and radar technology—popularly
called “Statcast”—MLB teams now have the ability to track both the
location where every ball is hit and the speed at which it leaves the
bat.240 If properly marshalled, this technology could allow teams to
build accurate risk models establishing the danger that errant fly-
ing objects pose to particular seating locations,241 placing the team
in the best position to take steps to alleviate the danger to fans.
Regardless, even without such advanced risk models, the defendant
team would almost certainly have to be considered the best risk
avoider in cases where a ball or bat was travelling into the stands
so quickly that a fan did not have sufficient reaction time to protect
herself.242 Because the spectator is literally unable to avoid injury
in these cases, the team will inevitably be in a superior position to
prevent the accident through the installation of additional protec-
tive screening.243
In contrast, one might nevertheless alternatively contend that
fans are themselves the best risk avoiders and should bear the
burden of their own injuries. As the argument goes, a fan can easi-
ly prevent his or her own injury in one of several ways, such as by
electing to sit in a protected seat, choosing to sit in a remote area of
239. See Horton, supra note 147, at 362 (“Stadium owners, who track the rate and severity
of injuries in different parts of their facilities, are better situated to avoid harm than fans.”).
240. See Baseball Savant: About, MLB.COM, https://baseballsavant.mlb.com/about [https://
perma.cc/A6HZ-N9FX] (describing Statcast as “a series of high-resolution optical cameras
along with radar equipment” that “precisely tracks the location and movements of the ball and
every player on the field, resulting in an unparalleled amount of information covering ev-
erything from the pitcher to the batter to baserunners and defensive players”).
241. See Paul Casella, Statcast Primer: Baseball Will Never Be the Same, MLB.COM (Apr.
24, 2015), https://www.mlb.com/news/statcast-primer-baseball-will-never-be-the-same/c-11
9234412 [https://perma.cc/C9U4-8J62] (“Statcast is capable of measuring the velocity, launch
angle and vector of the ball as it comes off the bat. From there, Statcast will also track the
hang time and distance that the ball travels, as well as a projected landing-point distance on
home runs.”).
242. Cf. Goplerud & Terry, supra note 37, at 450 (“[T]he argument that even a know-
ledgeable hockey fan is as a matter of law better able to prevent injury from a hundred mile
per hour puck than an adequate barrier is untenable.” (emphasis omitted)).
243. See supra notes 171-76 and accompanying text (discussing fans’ limited reaction time
to foul balls).
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the ballpark where a foul ball is unlikely to travel, or simply opting
not to attend baseball games at all.244 These arguments are ulti-
mately unpersuasive, however. First, as noted above, protected seat-
ing at modern professional games is often either cost-prohibitive or
entirely unavailable to fans on anything other than a season-ticket
basis, and thus does not represent a realistic option for many
fans.245 Meanwhile, any legal standard that requires spectators to
either sit in remote areas of the stadium or alternatively forgo
attending professional baseball games altogether would itself be
suboptimal.246 In either case, fans would be forced to refrain from
engaging in their preferred course of conduct, thus reducing aggre-
gate social welfare.247 Indeed, imposing an obligation on spectators
to sit in remote areas of the ballpark far removed from the action
will decrease the utility of the experience for hundreds of thousands
or millions of fans.248 Worse still, a rule suggesting that individuals
should simply stop attending baseball games altogether in order to
avoid injury would force fans to completely forgo otherwise socially
desirable behavior.249 Ultimately, the collective cost of the loss of
utility enjoyed by baseball fans adopting these alternative avoidance
mechanisms likely more than outweighs the relatively modest
244. See, e.g., Neinstein v. L.A. Dodgers, Inc., 229 Cal. Rptr. 612, 613-14 (Ct. App. 1986)
(suggesting that a fan wishing to avoid injury at a Los Angeles Dodgers game could elect to
sit in either one of the approximately 3,000 seats protected by screening, or else one of the
“approximately 20,000 seats on the reserved level and 6,000 seats in the right and left field
pavilions where the chances of being struck by a batted or thrown ball are extremely remote”);
see also Horton, supra note 147, at 352-53 (discussing Neinstein v. L.A. Dodgers, Inc., and the
court’s arguments).
245. See supra notes 194-204 and accompanying text (discussing recent changes in
ticketing policies that undercut the continued adherence to the Baseball Rule).
246. See Sugarman, supra note 118, at 836-37.
247. See, e.g., Richard W. Wright, The New Old Efficiency Theories of Causation and
Liability, 7 J. TORT L. 65, 71 (2014) (acknowledging the view that “the purpose of tort law ...
is or should be the maximization of aggregate social welfare, with welfare defined ... as utility
(pleasure or preference satisfaction)”).
248. Cf. Sugarman, supra note 118, at 836 (observing that such “precautions would deprive
the fans of an important pleasure they ought to be able to enjoy—seeing the game relatively
up-close without the annoyance of having to look through a screen”).
249. Cf. RICHARD POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE 72 (1981) (contending that in the
context of privacy concerns, social wealth is increased by giving citizens autonomous choice);
Timothy B. Fitzgerald, Comment, The “Inherent Risk” Doctrine, Amateur Coaching Negli-
gence, and the Goal of Loss Avoidance, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 889, 905 (2005) (noting “the social
desirab[ility] ... of good-spirited athletic competition”).
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cost—financial and otherwise—of installing additional safety
netting for the teams.
Thus, should courts subject the Baseball Rule to an economic
analysis, they will find that the defendant team will almost always
occupy the position of lowest-cost avoider for foul-ball-related
injuries. Indeed, considering the relatively trivial expense it would
take to prevent these injuries through the installation of additional
protective netting,250 compared to the frequency with which these
incidents occur and the financial toll they inflict,251 economic prin-
ciples of optimal risk allocation suggest that imposing liability on
the defendant team for foul-ball-related injuries will typically yield
the most socially beneficial outcome.252
Consequently, the insights provided by the law-and-economics
movement strongly suggest that the Baseball Rule currently fails
to impose liability on the lowest cost and best risk avoider—the
team itself—in the most efficient and socially optimal manner.253
Unfortunately, by artificially shielding teams from liability in foul
ball cases, courts’ adherence to the traditional doctrine has histor-
ically provided little incentive for teams to take greater steps to
best minimize the aggregate cost of these accidents, either through
the installation of additional protective netting or by experimenting
with other emerging injury-avoidance mechanisms.254
250. See Bumbaca, supra note 221.
251. See Wakamatsu, supra note 11, at 1 (discussing the frequency of fan injuries from foul
balls); Marsh, supra note 223 (discussing the medical costs of a fan who was hit by a foul ball
in the head).
252. For instance, under the classic formula established by Judge Learned Hand, liability
should arise in cases where “the cost to the defendant of avoiding the accident would have
been less than the cost of the accident, discounted by the probability of its occurrence, the
defendant's failure to avoid the accident is termed negligence.” Guido Calabresi & Jon T.
Hirschoff, Toward A Test for Strict Liability in Torts, 81 YALE L.J. 1055, 1057 (1972).
253. See supra Part III.A.
254. As of 2014, for instance, MLB had yet to undertake any analysis of foul-ball-related
injury rates. See Glovin, supra note 7 (reporting that, in 2014, “Major League Baseball ...
ha[d] no plans to mandate such protections during games, preferring to leave decisions to
individual teams”); Nathaniel Grow, On Broken Bats, Protective Netting, and the “Baseball
Rule”, FANGRAPHS (June 8, 2015), https://www.fangraphs.com/blogs/on-broken-bats-
protective-netting-and- the-baseball- rule/ [https://perma.cc/B8NL-ZWRW] (“[T]eams currently
have little financial motivation to take greater precautions to avoid fan injuries, as they are
not legally responsible for any injuries that do occur, but could potentially see the demand for
some of their most expensive seats decline should they install an additional barrier between
fans and the field.”); see also Horton, supra note 147, at 345 (contending that placing liability
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Nevertheless, the fact that teams constitute both the lowest cost
and best risk avoider in foul-ball injury cases does not necessarily
mean courts should require teams to install protective netting in
front of all—or necessarily even most—of the seating areas within
their ballparks, as such an obligation would itself be suboptimal.255
As noted above, many fans actively prefer to sit in seats providing
unobstructed views of the field, and thus any overextension of
protective netting beyond those seating areas presenting a signifi-
cant risk of injury could result in a reduction in aggregate social
welfare.256 Consequently, rather than require teams to install an
overabundance of screens, the most socially desirable result is likely
to fall somewhere between the status quo and universal netting of
the entire stadium.257 Thus, teams should be required to take steps
to protect fans in additional high-risk areas from errant projectiles,
and be permitted to leave those in lower-risk seats free to enjoy
unobstructed views of the field. Ascertaining the optimal liability
regime through which to secure such an outcome will be considered
in greater detail in Part IV.
B. Misplaced Reliance on the Doctrine of Assumption of Risk
A second flaw in the logic of courts’ persistent adherence to the
Baseball Rule relates to their continued frequent reliance on the
doctrine of assumption of risk to ground and justify their rulings on
a defendant team’s behalf.258 Indeed, even though the assumption-
of-risk defense has largely fallen out of favor legally,259 modern
courts continue to rely on the doctrine to validate their imposition
of the Baseball Rule.260
on teams “places the onus where it should be: on stadium owners who are in the best position
to consider new safety devices, procedures, and warnings”).
255. See Sugarman, supra note 118, at 836 (observing that such a “precaution[ ] would
deprive the fans of an important pleasure they ought to be able to enjoy—seeing the game
relatively up-close without the annoyance of having to look through a screen”).
256. See supra notes 232-33 and accompanying text.
257. See Grow, supra note 254.
258. See supra Part I.A.
259. See, e.g., Kenneth W. Simons, Assumption of Risk and Consent in the Law of Torts: A
Theory of Full Preference, 67 B.U. L. REV. 213, 213 (1987) (“According to most commentators
and a growing number of courts, the tort doctrine of assumption of risk should be abolished.”).
260. See, e.g., Gunther v. Charlotte Baseball, Inc., 854 F. Supp. 424, 428 (D.S.C. 1994)
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As an initial matter, reliance on the assumption of risk doctrine
has always been questionable in most spectator-injury cases. Dating
back to the initial formulation of the Baseball Rule in 1913, courts
have routinely confused two separate legal principles when ruling
for a defendant team: breach of duty and assumption of risk.261
Assumption of risk, as traditionally understood, constitutes an affir-
mative defense in cases where a defendant has been found negligent
due to a breach of her duty of care.262 In the overwhelming majority
of Baseball Rule cases, however, no breach has occurred because the
defendant team has satisfied its duty to its patrons by screening the
judicially perceived most dangerous area of its stadium (i.e., the
area immediately behind home plate) while also providing a suf-
ficient number of protected seats for the fans that can be expected
to desire them.263 Indeed, if assumption of risk were truly the basis
for the denial of liability in Baseball Rule cases, then the require-
ment that teams must install netting behind home plate would be
entirely superfluous, as the obviously heightened risk in that area
would provide the strongest justification for the assumption-of-risk
defense.264 Thus, even though courts routinely say that the plaintiff
(“[T]he vast majority of jurisdictions recognize [the] hazard [of being hit by a foul ball] to be
a risk that is assumed by the spectators.”); Lawson ex rel. Lawson v. Salt Lake Trappers, Inc.,
901 P.2d 1013, 1016 (Utah 1995) (“[B]eing struck by a foul ball is ‘one of the natural risks
assumed by spectators attending professional games.’”) (quoting Hamilton v. Salt Lake City
Corp., 237 P.2d 841, 843 (Utah 1951)).
261. See Crane v. Kan. City Baseball & Exhibition Co., 153 S.W. 1076, 1077-78 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1913) (concluding that defendants “fully performed [their] duty” by “provid[ing] screened
seats in the grand stand,” and that the plaintiff “assumed the ordinary risks” by “voluntarily
[choosing] an unprotected seat”); see also Broshuis, supra note 232, at 21 (finding that “some
courts focus[ ] more on assumption of risk principles and others ... on duty principles” in
Baseball Rule cases); Horton, supra note 147, at 346 (observing that courts have “used both
the duty-based baseball rule and assumption of risk to reject injured fans’ claims, often failing
to differentiate between them”); Khare, supra note 22, at 97 (“Courts generally do not
distinguish between the elements essential to primary assumption of risk and those of limited
duty.”).
262. See, e.g., Robert Cary, Case Note, Torts: Playing the Blame Game: The Division of
Fault Between Negligent Parties in Minnesota—Daly v. McFarland, 39 WM. MITCHELL L. REV.
275, 287 (2012) (“Just as contributory negligence is an affirmative defense, so too is assump-
tion of risk.”).
263. See generally Sugarman, supra note 118, at 836-40 (“[W]hile spectator foul ball
injuries are a regrettable by-product of baseball, they are generally not injuries that we
should blame on the stadium operators because there was nothing careless about their
behavior.”).
264. See Turner, supra note 136, at 170 (“[C]ases that rely on the primary assumption of
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has assumed the risk of his or her injury by electing to sit in an
unprotected area of the stadium, this is not actually the case as a
strict legal matter.265 Instead, the team is entitled to a favorable
judgment under the Baseball Rule because it did not breach a duty
of care in the first place, and thus cannot be held negligent as a
matter of law.266
Along these lines, viewing the Baseball Rule as simply providing
an ex ante delineation of the standard duty of reasonable care a
team owes to its spectators provides a better justification for why
courts continue to adhere to the doctrine even in cases where a
young child has been injured by a foul ball. Indeed, although it is
difficult to argue that young children knowingly assume the risk of
being hit by errant balls or bats at professional baseball games,267
courts nevertheless routinely rely on precisely this very logic in
spectator-injury cases.268 In Lawson ex rel. Lawson v. Salt Lake
Trappers, Inc., for example, the Supreme Court of Utah refused to
risk doctrine to support the rule that an owner need only protect fans seated behind home
plate are inherently contradictory because the area behind home plate—where the risk of
being struck by a foul ball is most obvious and most commonly appreciated—is precisely
where primary assumption of risk seems most applicable” (emphasis omitted)).
265. See Sugarman, supra note 118, at 837 (arguing that “‘assumption of risk’ is beside the
point” in foul-ball injury cases).
266. See id. at 836-40.
267. See 2 LOUIS A. LEHR, JR., PREMISES LIABILITY § 40:13.10 (3d ed. 2017) (reporting that
while children can generally be held to have assumed the risk of injury, the defendant should
“show that the injured child (1) had actual knowledge of the danger; (2) understood and
appreciated the risks associated with such danger; and (3) voluntarily exposed himself or
herself to those risks”); see also Champion, supra note 15, at 506 (“Thus, the key issue for
recovery for child spectator injuries in a sporting event is whether the child possesses the
ability to appreciate the risk of occupying the place that he occupies and his actual
understanding of that risk.”); Turner, supra note 136, at 164 (“[I]t seems problematic to bar
recovery on the basis of primary assumption of risk when the injured spectator is a young
child.”).
268. See, e.g., Quinn v. Recreation Park Ass’n, 46 P.2d 144, 145, 147 (Cal. 1935) (per
curiam) (denying recovery to a fourteen-year-old girl on the basis that “it would seem clear
that in accepting the unscreened seat, even temporarily, with full knowledge of the danger
attached to so doing, she assumed the risk of injury”); Benejam v. Detroit Tigers, Inc., 635
N.W.2d 219, 220, 224 (Mich. Ct. App. 2001) (holding that “the everyday reality of attending
a baseball game includes voluntarily subjecting oneself to the risk that a ball or bat might
leave the field and cause injury” in a case involving “a young girl”); Friedman v. Hous. Sports
Ass’n, 731 S.W.2d 572, 575-76 (Tex. App. 1987) (Cohen, J., concurring) (finding that an eleven-
year-old girl had assumed the risk of being injured by a foul ball). But see Fried et al., supra
note 196, at 429 (finding that minors are statistically more likely to prevail under the
Baseball Rule than adults).
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hold a minor-league team liable after a six-year-old girl was severely
injured by a foul ball on the grounds that the plaintiff had assumed
the risk of injury by sitting in an unprotected general admission
area of the stadium.269 Such decisions would be better reasoned if
courts instead characterized the Baseball Rule as simply establish-
ing the level of care the defendant team owed to the plaintiff, thus
necessitating the conclusion that the defendant was not responsi-
ble for the child’s injury since it had sufficiently screened its sta-
dium under the doctrine.270
Courts’ continued misplaced reliance on the doctrine of assump-
tion of risk is all the more surprising given the recent legal trend
towards the abolition of the defense.271 The movement to eliminate
assumption of risk dates back to the shift from contributory neg-
ligence regimes to those based on comparative negligence in torts
cases.272 Whereas the traditional theory of assumption of risk barred
a plaintiff ’s recovery entirely, under a comparative-negligence re-
gime, the fact that a plaintiff knowingly engaged in risky behavior
is better thought as one factor among many that may potentially
offset some or all of the defendant’s liability.273 As Professor Fleming
James famously argued:
A plaintiff ’s reasonable assumption of risk would not bar him
unless the risk was one which defendant had a legal right to put
up to plaintiff; and in such a case defendant breached no rel-
evant duty. A plaintiff ’s unreasonable assumption of risk would
269. 901 P.2d 1013, 1016 (Utah 1995) (concluding that spectators assume the risk of being
hit by a foul ball at professional baseball games and that as a result “the trial court properly
applied the doctrine of assumption of risk”).
270. See Sugarman, supra note 118, at 837 (“[T]he ‘no breach’ analysis explains why, for
example, even very young children in attendance at the game, who do not really know
anything about baseball or the danger of being hit by a foul ball, also properly lose their
cases.”).
271. See Broshuis, supra note 232, at 22 (“Some jurisdictions have gone further, not only
casting aside contributory negligence but also disposing of the assumption of risk defense.”).
272. See Horton, supra note 147, at 344 (“Contributory negligence ... has largely been
replaced by comparative fault, which allocates damages in proportion to the parties’ respective
responsibilities. In light of this change, the extent to which assumption of risk remains viable
has become one of the most unsettled issues in tort law.” (footnotes omitted)).
273. Cf. Simons, supra note 259, at 214 (“If, as the modernists claim, assumption of risk
is either a limitation upon duty or a form of contributory negligence, then it bars recovery in
the former guise but not in the latter.”).
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constitute contributory negligence on his part; and this would
be a defense without the need to invoke any separate doctrine.274
Following this logic, an increasing number of states have specifically
abolished the doctrine of assumption of risk in recent years, either
legislatively or judicially.275
Despite this general repudiation of the doctrine of assumption of
risk, modern courts have continued to rely on the defense when
rationalizing their decision to apply the Baseball Rule.276 In so do-
ing, these courts have struggled to justify their continued reliance
on an otherwise discredited defense, often emphasizing distinctions
between primary and secondary, or express and implied, assump-
tion of risk to explain why the defense continues to justify their
adherence the Baseball Rule.277 Jurists could avoid these logical
gymnastics by adopting the better view of the Baseball Rule, and
concluding that a defendant team is not liable for a particular injury
simply because it did not breach any legal duty owed to the plain-
tiff.278 Meanwhile, to the extent that prior courts have erroneously
based their Baseball Rule jurisprudence on the assumption of risk
defense, the recent abrogation of the latter doctrine offers future
courts a prime opportunity to dispense with a suboptimal rule in
spectator-injury cases.
274. Fleming James, Jr., Assumption of Risk: Unhappy Reincarnation, 78 YALE L.J. 185,
185 (1968) (footnotes omitted).
275. See Austill, supra note 35, at 100 (“Some courts have abrogated the assumption of risk
defense because it was incompatible with comparative fault, which abrogated the contributory
negligence defense.”); see also 57B AM. JUR. 2D Negligence § 761 (2018) (“Some courts have
indicated that the doctrine of assumption of risk, as a complete defense, does not or should
not survive the adoption of comparative negligence laws.”).
276. See Knight v. Jewett, 834 P.2d 696, 700-02, 709-11 (Cal. 1992) (adhering to Baseball
Rule precedents in a case involving an injury in a backyard football game on the basis of
assumption of risk, despite acknowledging that the doctrine had generally been abrogated in
the state of California); cf. Joe Novosel, Note, Baseball Bats Out of Hell: Potential Theories of
Liability Arising From Maple Bat Injuries, 8 DEPAUL J. SPORTS L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 95,
99 (2011) (“‘[B]aseball rule’ jurisdictions that have subsequently adopted a comparative-neg-
ligence regime ... have not altered the rule’s limited duty.”).
277. See Horton, supra note 147, at 353-54 (dissecting the confused logic of the Supreme
Court of California’s decision in Knight v. Jewett); see also Austill, supra note 35, at 99-100
(discussing various forms of assumption of risk).
278. See Sugarman, supra note 118, at 836-40.
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IV. COURTS SHOULD ABANDON (OR MODIFY) THE BASEBALL RULE
As the foregoing analysis has shown, recent changes in the fac-
tual and legal underpinnings of the Baseball Rule have undercut
modern courts’ continued reliance on the doctrine. Consequently,
the time has come for courts (or legislatures) to update their juris-
prudence (or statutes) to impose greater liability on teams when
fans are hit by errant bats or balls while attending professional
baseball games.
A. Strict Liability for Spectator Injuries
The most efficient manner in which courts or legislatures can
move forward would be to replace the Baseball Rule with a strict-
liability regime. As noted above, law-and-economics scholars have
long asserted that tort law can best reduce the overall social cost of
accidents by imposing liability on the lowest cost or best risk avoid-
er, thus forcing that party “to internalize the costs of [its] potentially
harmful activity”—the so-called “[e]fficient-deterrence theory” of li-
ability.279 Strict liability, in turn, is believed to “[i]nduce[ ] [such]
precaution by holding the potential injurer liable for losses if he
caused them.... Because he can never escape liability for harms that
he has caused, the best that a potential injurer can do under strict
liability is to take sufficient precaution to minimize his expected
liability.”280 Strict-liability regimes are particularly justified, acc-
ording to law-and-economics scholars, in situations presenting a
case of “unilateral precaution,” namely those in which only one
party could realistically be expected to “have taken [measures] to
reduce the likelihood of the accident or its consequences.”281 Indeed,
on this view, “actors should bear the costs of those accidents that
are ‘characteristic’ of their activities and then distribute those costs
among all those who benefit from the imposition of the risks at
issue.”282 Strict liability is believed to most effectively achieve this
279. Anthony J. Sebok, Punitive Damages: From Myth to Theory, 92 IOWA L. REV. 957, 977
(2007).
280. Thomas S. Ulen, The Lessons of Law and Economics, 2 J. LEGAL ECON. 103, 115 (1992).
281. Id.
282. Gregory C. Keating, The Theory of Enterprise Liability and Common Law Strict
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outcome due to the best risk avoider’s “superior ability to spread ac-
cident costs through insurance.”283 Moreover, “[t]he cost-pressures
of higher insurance premiums also create incentives for [the best-
risk avoider] to take safety precautions for their risky activities.”284
These insights support the imposition of a strict-liability regime
upon the professional baseball industry. As discussed above, not
only are teams better positioned to reduce the cost of spectator
injuries through the installation of additional netting, but they are
also in a superior position compared to their patrons with respect to
assessing the risk level present in different sections of a ballpark.285
In contrast, short of avoiding any high-risk seating areas entirely,
fans may often have virtually no ability to prevent these injuries,
with balls or bats moving so quickly that it is physically impossible
for the spectator to react in time to protect herself.286 Thus, many
injuries from foul balls and flying bats are best understood as
presenting a case of unilateral precaution, where the team is the
only party in a position to realistically reduce the likelihood of many
of these accidents.287
If baseball teams were forced to internalize the cost of their fans’
injuries under a strict-liability regime, then each team would be
forced to decide for itself how to best balance fan safety with
consumer demand for unobstructed views. Such a decision-making
process would likely come down to a simple matter of economics.288
On the one hand, the team would have to determine how much
ticket revenue it would stand to lose by installing a screen in front
of a particular section of seats. On the other hand, the team would
assess the heightened cost of premises liability insurance should the
lack of netting in a section result in one or more fans incurring a
costly physical injury.
Liability, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1285, 1334 (2001).
283. Danielle Keats Citron, Reservoirs of Danger: The Evolution of Public and Private Law
at the Dawn of the Information Age, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 241, 287 (2007).
284. Id. 
285. See supra notes 216-38 and accompanying text (assessing the Baseball Rule cases
under a theory of economic analysis). 
286. See supra notes 176-82 and accompanying text (considering the risk of being hit by an
unavoidable foul ball while attending a professional baseball game).
287. See Ulen, supra note 280, at 115 (defining the theory of unilateral precaution).
288. See generally id. at 107-12 (explaining the “economic model of individual or
organizational decision making about the optimal allocation of resources” between building
in safety and producing products).
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The most likely outcome of such a balancing act would be for
teams to install additional netting to protect the highest-risk areas
of their ballparks from flying objects, while preserving unobstructed
views in lower-risk sections of seats.289 Such a scenario would likely
best minimize the overall cost of foul-ball-related injuries, thus
maximizing aggregate social welfare.290 Indeed, fans sitting in high-
ly dangerous areas of a ballpark who are not currently required to
be protected under existing interpretations of the Baseball Rule
would now find themselves safeguarded from potentially unavoid-
able injuries. At the same time, fans hoping to enjoy an unob-
structed view and potentially catch a less-dangerous foul ball would
still have plenty of seating options available. And in the rare case
that someone seated in one of these lower-risk areas of the park is
injured by a ball or bat leaving the field of play, then rather than
having to internalize the cost of the accident themselves, they could
instead seek potential compensation from the team under its
premises liability insurance policy.
Admittedly, such a liability rule could slightly increase the cost
of attending a baseball game, should some teams elect to pass the
additional cost of their insurance policies on to fans.291 Ultimately,
however, the extent of any such cost increase is likely to be modest,
assuming that the team has also installed screening in front of its
highest-risk seating sections. In any event, such an outcome is
ultimately justified from a policy perspective insofar as it most
efficiently places the cost of spectator injuries on the lowest-cost and
best risk avoider.
Moreover, if a court or legislature was so inclined, it could further
reduce the expected cost of imposing strict liability on professional
baseball teams by incorporating an accompanying comparative-
289. Cf. Horton, supra note 147, at 368-69 (contending that factors such as increased
netting’s “detrimental effect on ticket sales,” or the fact that “few fans have been hurt in [a
particular] area of the stadium” would potentially warrant teams exercising a lesser level of
protection).
290. Cf. Greenfield, supra note 153 (“Make the [Red] Sox, or any team, pay for injuries
caused by the products they produce and promote. That will prompt them to work out the
proper level of safety on their own.”).
291. See Roger I. Abrams, Spectators and the Baseball Rule, HUFFINGTON POST (June 8,
2015, 1:14 PM), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/roger-i-abrams/spectators-and-the-baseba_b_
7536610.html [https://perma.cc/9JBC-AYKV] (“If each club were to raise ticket prices by a
slight amount, each spectator would be covered by the insurance that increment would
purchase.”).
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negligence regime.292 By doing so, courts or legislatures could allow
the fact-finder to consider evidence showing that a plaintiff con-
tributed to his own injury by himself acting negligently, such as by
being intoxicated, failing to pay sufficient attention to the action on
the playing field, or even by voluntarily bringing himself into
contact with the ball or bat by trying to catch it.293 In these cases,
the court could fairly conclude that the plaintiff was responsible for
a (potentially sizeable) share of his own injury, and thus substan-
tially reduce the team’s liability for the accident.294
One potential objection to replacing the Baseball Rule with a
strict-liability regime bears mentioning, namely that such a shift
could result in excessive tort liability being imposed on operators
of amateur baseball fields. Indeed, while this Article has predomi-
nantly focused on injuries occurring at professional baseball games,
courts have typically applied the Baseball Rule to cases arising at
amateur facilities as well.295 Unlike professional teams, which tend
to be well heeled and directly profit from the activity that places
fans at heightened risk,296 amateur stadium operators—often local
municipalities—tend to operate in a more financially precarious po-
sition.297 Consequently, one might reasonably fear that imposing
strict liability on these amateur facilities could result in the im-
position of significant new netting- or insurance-related costs. These
potentially unaffordable expenditures could possibly force a number
of municipal facilities to close, thus harming overall social welfare
292. Cf. Mark E. Roszkowski & Robert A. Prentice, Reconciling Comparative Negligence
and Strict Liability: A Public Policy Analysis, 33 ST. LOUIS L.J. 19, 47-59 (1988) (examining
the compatibility of comparative negligence and strict-liability regimes).
293. See Horton, supra note 147, at 370 (noting that comparative negligence would allow
courts to “weed out unmeritorious claims [against a team] and reduce plaintiffs’ recoveries in
proportion to their responsibility”).
294. See id. at 371-73.
295. See, e.g., Bellezzo v. State, 851 P.2d 847, 848-49 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992) (featuring a
plaintiff injured at a college baseball game); Arnold v. City of Cedar Rapids, 443 N.W.2d 332,
332 (Iowa 1989) (suit by a woman injured at a recreational softball game); Akins v. Glens
Falls City Sch. Dist., 424 N.E.2d 531, 532, 534 (N.Y. 1981) (applying the Baseball Rule in a
case involving a woman injured at a high school baseball game).
296. See Brown, supra note 222.
297. See, e.g., Mat Mikesell, Some American Legion Baseball Teams Feeling Financial
Strain, HERALD-WHIG (Aug. 3, 2016, 8:37 AM), www.whig.com/20160803/some-american-
legion-baseball-teams-feeling-financial-strain [https://perma.cc/B4T9-N7D7].
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by reducing the exercise and leisure opportunities for millions of
people.298
Courts or legislatures could sidestep this legitimate concern by
carving out an exception for amateur playing facilities from their
newly created strict-liability regimes. Indeed, so long as an amateur
facility is found to have generally taken sufficient steps to protect
its most dangerous seating areas—either as traditionally defined or
as interpreted more expansively as suggested in Part IV.B—then it
could continue to receive protection under the traditional Baseball
Rule. This would thus ensure that the imposition of strict liability
on professional teams does not decrease the availability of recre-
ational playing facilities, while at the same time providing addi-
tional incentive for professional baseball teams to take greater steps
to protect their fans.
Consequently, future courts should decline to apply the Baseball
Rule, and instead subject professional teams to a strict-liability
regime, holding them presumptively liable anytime a fan is injured
by an errant flying object at a baseball game.
B. Expanding the Definition of a Ballpark’s “Most Dangerous
Area”
Alternatively, if courts or legislatures are unwilling to impose
strict liability on teams to incentivize them to take greater precau-
tions to protect their spectators from injury, then a more measured
approach would be for courts to expand the existing duty of care
that teams owe their fans under the Baseball Rule. Modern courts
relying on the doctrine have typically defined the “most dangerous
area” of a ballpark as simply being those sections of seats located
immediately behind home plate.299 So long as a team provides
protective screening in front of that area, and assuming that the
number of screened seats is sufficient to meet average anticipated
298. See, e.g., Joshua H. Whitman, Note, Winning at All Costs: Using Law & Economics to
Determine the Proper Role of Government in Regulating the Use of Performance-Enhancing
Drugs in Professional Sports, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 459, 482-83 (“Given the undeniably strong
interest America has in athletics, anything undermining the athletic enterprise ... has a
negative impact on the country’s overall social welfare.”).
299. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
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consumer demand, then the team is not required to take any further
precautions to protect its patrons.300
This overly rigid definition of the “most dangerous area” of a
stadium is unwarranted as both a matter of law and fact. In a
typical negligence case, having defined a team’s duty of care as
requiring that it provide netting in front of the most dangerous
areas of the stadium,301 the question of whether the defendant
breached that duty would normally be one of fact.302 Rather than
engage in that factual inquiry to determine which areas of a
ballpark actually pose the greatest risk to fans, however, courts
have instead simply assumed as a matter of law that the risk to fans
is most acute only in the area directly behind home plate.303 Given
recent trends in stadium construction and the presumptive in-
creased speed with which balls enter the stands, there is strong
reason to believe that other sections of seats beyond those immedi-
ately behind home plate now pose a heightened risk to fans, and
thus are themselves quite dangerous.304 Moreover, because every
baseball stadium is unique—featuring a playing field of distinctive
shape with fans situated varying distances from the field—a de-
termination of which areas of a ballpark present the greatest threat
to spectators will inherently vary on a stadium-by-stadium basis.305
Consequently, future courts applying the Baseball Rule should,
at a minimum, reject the rigid definition of the “most dangerous
area” of a stadium and instead engage in a more fact-intensive
inquiry to determine which sections of the ballpark in question are
300. See supra notes 90-91 and accompanying text.
301. See supra notes 121-22 and accompanying text (discussing the typical procedure in
negligence cases).
302. See, e.g., William V. Dorsaneo, III, Judges, Juries, and Reviewing Courts, 53 SMU L.
REV. 1497, 1499 (2000) (observing that “breach of duty and causation are questions of fact”).
303. See, e.g., supra notes 91-92 and accompanying text.
304. See Verducci, supra note 206, at 64 (“The best seats are the worst. A spot behind or
next to a dugout gives a baseball fan the opportunity to see a ballplayer sweat, hear what
little infield chatter remains in the game and dodge potentially lethal projectiles whizzing at
more than 100 mph. Unprotected by netting, such seats are among the most dangerous in
sports.”).
305. Cf. Christian Red, MLB Commish Explains the Hurdle to Protective Netting in Every
Major League Ballpark, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (July 27, 2017, 4:52 PM), http://www.nydailynews.
com/sports/baseball/mlb-commish-explains-hurdle-extra-netting-30-ballparks-article-
1.3362375 [https://perma.cc/WG3A-BRGH] (citing MLB Commissioner Rob Manfred as ex-
plaining that “different stadium designs pose one hurdle toward establishing a league-wide
mandate on the issue” of safety netting).
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the least safe. Such an inquiry should consider a variety of factors,
such as data regarding how often foul balls typically enter the rel-
evant section during a given game and the number of fans who have
been hurt by flying objects in the area in recent years. In addition,
courts should also determine the distance between the first row of
seats in the seating section in question and home plate, a measure-
ment that will allow them to calculate the minimum reaction time
that a fan in the area is likely to have to protect herself from a foul
ball travelling at a speed of 100 miles per hour or more. At the same
time, courts could also factor in whether a ballpark is used strictly
for amateur games, which will generally present a lesser risk to
spectators, thus often requiring less extensive protection measures
and potentially warranting a laxer imposition of liability.306
While the precise identification of which seating areas are the
most dangerous will ultimately vary by stadium,307 over time courts
conducting such an analysis would likely establish more objective
standards to help guide professional teams in meeting their legal
duty. For instance, courts could rule that any section of seating in
which fans would be expected to have less than a second to react to
a hard-hit foul ball constitutes a “most dangerous area,” and thus
must be protected by netting in order for the team to escape liability
under the Baseball Rule.
Not only would such an approach be more consistent with the
general practice of determining whether a defendant has breached
its duty of care in negligence cases,308 but it is also warranted in
light of recent action by MLB. Specifically, following a spate of
injuries in 2015, MLB issued a league-wide recommendation en-
couraging its teams to expand their protective netting to cover any
seat located within seventy feet of home plate and/or residing be-
tween the two dugouts.309 The fact that MLB itself has officially
306. Cf. supra notes 295-98 and accompanying text (considering the unique policy con-
siderations surrounding the application of the Baseball Rule to amateur facilities).
307. See Red, supra note 305.
308. See supra notes 121-22 and accompanying text (discussing typical practice in negli-
gence cases).
309. See Paul Hagen, MLB Recommends Netting Between Dugouts, MLB.COM (Dec. 9,
2015), https://mlb.com/news/mlb-issues-recommendations-on-netting/c-15923307 [https://
perma.cc/WMT7-DRUG] (“Major League Baseball has recommended that all teams should
lengthen the safety netting at their ballparks to increase fan safety.”); see also Lucchese,
supra note 21, at 100-01 (discussing the MLB recommendation).
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encouraged its teams to extend their protective netting beyond just
the area immediately behind home plate strongly suggests that the
Baseball Rule, as traditionally applied, no longer imposes a rea-
sonable level of care upon professional baseball teams. Indeed, if the
League itself is calling on teams to screen any seat located within
seventy feet of home plate,310 courts should follow suit by adopting
a more expansive interpretation of the “most dangerous area” of a
ballpark.
That having been said, the fact that MLB has encouraged its
teams to take greater steps to protect fans from flying objects311 does
not, in and of itself, resolve the issue entirely. Not only are major-
league teams not bound by the League’s recommendations in this
area,312 but neither are the nearly 250 teams313 competing at the
minor-league level.314 Perhaps more importantly, there is also no
guarantee that MLB’s proposed standard will satisfactorily protect
all of the sections of every professional ballpark that present the
greatest risk to fans.
Consequently, at a minimum, future courts should reject a rigid
application of the Baseball Rule, and instead adopt a more flexible
approach towards evaluating the risk of being hit by an errant
projectile in other areas of a ballpark beyond those immediately
behind home plate. Not only is such an approach more consistent
with typical practice in negligence cases, but it will also further
incentivize teams to better protect their spectators.315
310. See Hagen, supra note 309.
311. See id.
312. See Glovin, supra note 7.
313. Teams by Name, MILB.COM, www.milb.com/milb/info/teams.jsp [https://perma.cc/
3XZ7-L5SJ].
314. See Benjamin Hill, Net Gain: Minor League Teams Enhance Fan Safety, MILB.COM
(Mar. 8, 2018, 10:00 AM), https://www.milb.com/milb/news/safety-first-extended-netting-in-
the-minor-leagues/c-268119186 [https://perma.cc/5JMS-ZBGT] (reporting that Pat O’Conner,
president of Minor League Baseball, agrees with the “recommendations made by Major
League Baseball” on protective netting and suggests minor league teams “implement these
recommendations as soon as practical”).
315. Cf. Horton, supra note 147, at 345 (contending that imposing liability on teams “places
the onus where it should be: on stadium owners who are in the best position to consider new
safety devices, procedures, and warnings”).
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C. Imposing a Duty to Warn
Finally, in addition to expanding the scope of a team’s potential
liability under the Baseball Rule, courts should also reconsider the
traditional rule that teams do not have a legal duty to warn fans of
the potential danger presented by foul balls or flying bats. As noted
above, courts have historically refused to require baseball teams to
warn fans of these hazards, concluding that the threat posed by
errant flying objects is open and obvious.316 Indeed, courts in other
contexts have traditionally held that landowners are under no
obligation to warn their invitees of open and obvious dangers, on
the assumption that such a warning would be superfluous given
the clear and unmistakable nature of the threat.317
However, the soundness of applying this general common law rule
to professional baseball teams is questionable for two reasons. First,
while it is undoubtedly true that most fans would easily perceive the
fact that a ball or bat may occasionally fly into the stands as a
general matter, it is less clear whether a majority of spectators
recognize the actual level of risk that these flying objects present.
Indeed, injured spectators often insist that while they were gen-
erally aware that baseballs sometimes enter the stands, they as-
sumed that they would typically take the form of an easily avoidable
pop-up, not a line drive hit at 100 miles per hour or more.318
Meanwhile, even those fans who are aware that balls occasionally
enter the stands at high rates of speed nevertheless may be unduly
overconfident in their ability to react in time to catch the ball or
otherwise protect themselves from injury. In other words, many fans
will be blinded to the actual risk posed by hard-hit foul balls due to
what is known in the field of behavioral economics as optimism
bias—the mistaken belief that one is less likely to experience a
316. See supra notes 111-14 and accompanying text.
317. See, e.g., LEHR, JR., supra note 267, § 38:11 (“A landowner has no duty to warn an
entrant of open and obvious defects of which the entrant should be aware in the exercise of
reasonable care. If the danger is one that anyone would discover, the landowner has no duty
to warn of it.” (footnotes omitted)).
318. See, e.g., Neinstein v. L.A. Dodgers, Inc., 229 Cal. Rptr. 612, 613 (Ct. App. 1986) (in
which “plaintiff admitted that she had witnessed baseballs hit into the stands and was
‘generally familiar’ with the game” but nevertheless “denied that she ... [understood] the
danger to which spectators are subject”).
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negative event than others—and thus will also fail to fully perceive
the extent to which their safety may be endangered.319
Even if one were to concede that the actual danger posed by foul
balls and broken bats is sufficiently open and obvious, however, an
important exception to the general no-duty-to-warn rule exists at
common law.320 Specifically, even when a hazard is considered ob-
vious, courts will still impose a duty to warn on defendants in cases
where their invitees are likely to be distracted and thus cannot be
expected to fully protect themselves from injury.321 This exception
is especially relevant in the context of fan injuries at professional
baseball games. As discussed above, fans attending professional
games today are confronted by a number of potential distractions,
ranging from flashy scoreboards and hyperactive mascots, to smart-
phones and conversations with friends.322 Each of these distractions
threatens to divert spectators’ attention from the action transpiring
on the playing field, thereby increasing the chances that a fan will
fail to react in time to protect herself from an object leaving the
playing field.323
To be sure, one could question the likely efficacy of any warnings
offered by baseball teams. Indeed, mandatory notice regimes have
generally fallen under criticism from scholars in recent years for
being largely ineffectual.324 Moreover, even though many teams
319. See, e.g., Joshua D. Wright & Douglas H. Ginsburg, Behavioral Law and Economics:
Its Origins, Fatal Flaws, and Implications for Liberty, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 1033, 1044 (2012)
(“The second type of self-control error is optimism bias. Behavioral economists have identified
circumstances in which individuals appear to underestimate the likelihood of their expe-
riencing a loss. Jolls, Sunstein, and Thaler describe optimism bias as ‘[a] common feature of
human behavior’ characterized by people tending to ‘think that bad events are far less likely
to happen to them than to others.’ The tendency to underestimate the likelihood of a bad
outcome leads decisionmakers to take on too much risk. Accordingly, this bias is often blamed
for an individual’s impulsive or high-risk choices that might indicate a lack of self-control.”
(footnotes omitted)).
320. See LEHR, JR., supra note 267, § 38:11.
321. See id. (“An exception to the open and obvious danger rule exists when a person has
reason to expect that the invitee’s attention may be distracted, so that the invitee will not
discover what is obvious, or will forget what the invitee has discovered, or fail to protect him
or herself against it. In these cases, the fact that the danger is known or obvious is not
conclusive in determining the duty of the possessor, or whether the possessor has acted
reasonably under the circumstances.”).
322. See supra Part II.D.
323. See supra Part II.D.
324. See, e.g., M. Ryan Calo, Against Notice Skepticism in Privacy (and Elsewhere), 87
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1027, 1029 (2012) (“Mandatory notice is understandably popular, but it
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currently provide some warnings to fans—typically taking the form
of a legally invalid disclaimer on the back of the fan’s ticket325 and
safety announcements via the scoreboard and public address
system326—injuries from foul balls still frequently occur.327
Nevertheless, imposing a legal duty on teams to sufficiently warn
fans of the dangers of flying objects offers several potential benefits
over the status quo. Because teams would be under a legal obliga-
tion to provide sufficiently effective warnings to spectators,328 the
imposition of such a duty would incentivize teams to experiment
with new, more productive methods of notifying fans of the dangers
posed by flying objects. Along these lines, a legally sufficient
warning would likely entail not just a warning to spectators that
bats or balls may occasionally enter the stands—as is commonly the
case today329—but would likely also require teams to specifically
notify fans of the heightened risk of injury that these objects may
present.330 Spectators would thus be better informed of the actual
danger that foul balls and flying bats pose, and would therefore be
more likely to take steps to better protect themselves from injury,
is also controversial.”).
325. See, e.g., Yates v. Chi. Nat’l League Ball Club, Inc., 595 N.E.2d 570, 581 (Ill. App. Ct.
1992) (“[T]he disclaimer on the back of plaintiff ’s ticket could not form the basis of defense
because the print was so small that it was not legibly reproduced on the photocopy submitted
to the trial court. Plaintiff ’s acceptance of a ticket containing a disclaimer in fine print on the
back is not binding for the purposes of asserting express assumption of the risk.”); see also
Alexander J. Drago, Assumption of Risk: An Age-Old Defense Still Viable in Sports and
Recreation Cases, 12 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 583, 589 (2002) (noting that
“the release and waiver language typically appearing on the back of event tickets is unen-
forceable” for several reasons: “First, there is no signature required, making it difficult to
argue the existence of an agreement. Second, the ticket holder may not read the provision,
and thus may claim lack of notice. Third, the printing is usually so small, it is not viewed as
reasonable notice. And fourth, the space on the back of the ticket is so limited, it is impossible
to print all the needed exculpatory language.”).
326. See, e.g., Rees v. Cleveland Indians Baseball Co., No. 84183, 2004 WL 2610531, at *5
(Ohio Ct. App. 2004) (describing how fans were notified as to the safety issues through the
scoreboard and a public address).
327. See supra notes 224-31 and accompanying text.
328. Cf. Carol McCrehan Parker, Camping Trips and Family Trees: Must Tennessee
Physicians Warn Their Patients' Relatives of Genetic Risks?, 65 TENN. L. REV. 585, 616 (1998)
(noting that in cases where a duty to warn is present, “courts may be asked to evaluate the
sufficiency of the warning provided”).
329. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
330. See supra notes 225-27 and accompanying text.
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whether by paying closer attention to the game or by opting to sit in
less dangerous seating areas during future trips to the ballpark.
Along these same lines, courts could also require teams to provide
better disclosure of whether particular seats are protected by
netting at the time tickets are purchased. Although some MLB
teams currently list which sections of seats are protected by
screening on their websites, others do not.331 Meanwhile, few—if
any—teams actually allow fans to specifically search for seats based
on their protected status when purchasing tickets online.332 By
imposing a duty to warn on teams, courts (or legislators) could
pressure teams to provide better disclosure of whether a seat is
protected. Such a requirement would once again enable fans to
better protect themselves from the potential danger presented by
foul balls, while at the same time helping remind even those fans
opting to purchase unprotected seats of the need to be alert while
watching the game.
CONCLUSION
The professional baseball industry is radically different in myriad
ways today than it was a century ago. Nevertheless, courts continue
to rely on a one hundred-year-old legal doctrine when determining
whether to hold teams liable for spectator injuries resulting from
errant balls or bats leaving the field of play. Although the Baseball
Rule may have been justified at the time it was first established, its
subsequent legal development, as well as recent changes in both the
law of torts and the game of professional baseball itself have
undermined courts’ continued reliance on this antiquated doctrine.
Indeed, considering that baseball teams are best positioned to
protect their fans from errant flying objects, this Article has
concluded that the time has come for courts to dispense with the
Baseball Rule, and presumptively hold professional teams strictly
liable for their fans’ injuries, forcing teams to fully internalize the
cost of the accidents their games produce.
331. See supra notes 194-96.
332. See supra notes 194-96.
